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ABSTRACT

Cyber-Physical Manufacturing System (CPMS)—a next generation manufacturing
system—seamlessly integrates digital and physical domains via the internet or computer networks.
It will enable drastic improvements in production flexibility, capacity, and cost-efficiency.
However, enlarged connectivity and accessibility from the integration can yield unintended
security concerns. The major concern arises from cyber-physical attacks, which can cause damages
to the physical domain while attacks originate in the digital domain. Especially, such attacks can
be performed by insiders easily but in a more critical manner: Insider Threats.
Insiders can be defined as anyone who is or has been affiliated with a system. Insiders have
knowledge and access authentications of the system's properties, therefore, can perform more
serious attacks than outsiders. Furthermore, it is hard to detect or prevent insider threats in CPMS
in a timely manner, since they can easily bypass or incapacitate general defensive mechanisms of
the system by exploiting their physical access, security clearance, and knowledge of the system
vulnerabilities.
This thesis seeks to address the above issues by developing an insider threat tolerant CPMS,
enhanced by a service-oriented blockchain augmentation and conducting experiments & analysis.
The aim of the research is to identify insider threat vulnerabilities and improve the security of
CPMS.
Blockchain's unique distributed system approach is adopted to mitigate the insider threat
risks in CPMS. However, the blockchain limits the system performance due to the arbitrary block
generation time and block occurrence frequency. The service-oriented blockchain augmentation is
providing physical and digital entities with the blockchain communication protocol through a

service layer. In this way, multiple entities are integrated by the service layer, which enables the
services with less arbitrary delays while retaining their strong security from the blockchain. Also,
multiple independent service applications in the service layer can ensure the flexibility and
productivity of the CPMS.
To study the effectiveness of the blockchain augmentation against insider threats, two
example models of the proposed system have been developed: Layer Image Auditing System
(LIAS) and Secure Programmable Logic Controller (SPLC). Also, four case studies are designed
and presented based on the two models and evaluated by an Insider Attack Scenario Assessment
Framework. The framework investigates the system's security vulnerabilities and practically
evaluates the insider attack scenarios.
The research contributes to the understanding of insider threats and blockchain
implementations in CPMS by addressing key issues that have been identified in the literature. The
issues are addressed by EBIS (Establish, Build, Identify, Simulation) validation process with
numerical experiments and the results, which are in turn used towards mitigating insider threat
risks in CPMS.
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Chapter 1. Introduction

In this chapter, the motivation of the research is discussed by introducing the overview of
Cyber-Physical Manufacturing System and its security. The scope of the research is also presented
by defining three main key words: Cyber-Physical Manufacturing System, Insider Threats, and
Blockchain. Next, the problem statement, hypothesis, and objective of the research are presented
and discussed. Finally, a dissertation overview is provided.
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1.1

Motivation
The realization of fully automated manufacturing has been accelerated by recent

technological advances. In particular, a future generation manufacturing system, such as CyberPhysical Manufacturing System (CPMS) in which digital and physical domains are seamlessly
integrated via the internet or computer networks, will enable drastic improvements in production
flexibility, capacity, and cost-efficiency (Monostori et al., 2016).
However, such a manufacturing system necessitates adequate security before it can be
safely operated. CPMS ushers in the unique security challenges from the sheer volume and
pervasiveness of exchanged data, and increased accessibility of the system by its outsiders and
insiders. CPMS becomes a target by attackers because it involves a myriad of confidential and
valuable data—such as manufacturing details and product specifications—over numerous
connected physical components (Song et al., 2020). Additionally, the fully integrated system
structure of CPMS is vulnerable to Cyber-Physical Attacks, which can cause damages in the
physical domain due to attacks originating in the cyber domain (Chhetri et al., 2016). Specifically,
such attacks can be performed by insiders more easily than outsiders. Insiders are anyone who has
been or is affiliated with a system. Since insiders already have physical access, security clearance,
and knowledge of the system vulnerabilities, they can bypass or incapacitate general defensive
mechanisms of the system to manipulate manufacturing information without being discovered
(Song et al., 2020).
Research on insider threats started emerging in manufacturing systems only recently—
around 2018. However, a myriad of security organizations has raised their concerns about the
seriousness of insider threats in manufacturing systems. According to the survey conducted at the
2019 RSA conference by Gurucul (GURUCUL, 2019), the manufacturing industry is the most
2

vulnerable industry against insider threats. Furthermore, 40% of insider threats in the sector could
not be detected initially, nor detected after the data had been breached. The Intelligence and
National Security Alliance (INSA) confirmed these difficulties in their 2018 reports: only 8% of
survey respondents have independent defensive preparations for insider threats, and the majority
of respondents answered that developing skilled labor and defensive preparations remain elusive
because it is difficult to detect and predict insider threats (INSA, 2018a, 2018b). Additionally,
IBM reported interesting statistics regarding the insiders (IBM, 2020b, 2020c). According to the
investigation on their customer companies, the number of incidents by misconfigurations surged
in 2019, but there was actually a decrease in the number of reported incidents from
misconfigurations. Regarding this issue, IBM stated that when the misconfiguration incident did
occur, the damage was significantly greater than before. This implies that insiders can also
unintentionally compromise the system, but the consequences become more serious. In addition,
social engineering and malicious insiders are the highest threat vectors based on the average cost
of data breaches per the percentage of malicious breaches among 524 organizations, from August
2019 to April 2020.
In spite of the gravity of insider security, there has been negligible research progress.
Because of varied human motivations and limited understanding of human psychology in this
subject, it is difficult to predict insider attacks in advance (Moore, 2016). Many attacks caused by
insiders are stealthier than those by outsiders because insider's trails are easy to hide (Sinclair &
Smith, 2008). Also, insiders create a dilemma in the system: additional flexibility in authorized
access results in less supervised control over the process, which in turn decreases the security of
the system (Bishop et al., 2014). Therefore, it is arduous to thwart insiders by using hierarchical
and centralized approaches.
3

Meanwhile, blockchain technology has gained traction with many researchers as a means
to enhance the security of systems in various industry sectors over the past few years. Blockchain’s
uniqueness as a decentralization-based defensive mechanism has been considered in order to shift
the existing paradigm in general security measurements of manufacturing systems. The core
mechanism of the blockchain is to store the exact same data in all the machines in the connected
network, as well as to link the old data and new data to maintain the entire data integrity. In this
way, the blockchain can ensure an unprecedented level of security against outsiders and even
insiders.
However, many gaps in understanding of insiders in manufacturing systems and practical
implementations of the blockchain to manufacturing systems still remain. Specifically, a
blockchain communication protocol has seldom been discussed from the viewpoint of insiders in
manufacturing systems. Furthermore, blockchain-based systems

have limited system

performances due to the arbitrary block generation time and block occurrence frequency. As yet,
there has been no systematic investigation of the use of blockchain technology concepts and
techniques for security against insider threats.
The understanding of insider threats and blockchain implementation in CPMS may lead to
a more consistent method of detecting or preventing insiders, mitigating an insider threat risk,
efficient control of blockchain networks, and greater effectiveness in blockchain communication
protocols in manufacturing systems.

4

1.2

Scope of the research

1.2.1

Cyber-Physical Manufacturing System
Cyber-Physical Manufacturing System (CPMS) originated from Cyber-Physical System

(CPS), which is an automated and distributed system that integrates digital and physical assets
with communication networks and computing infrastructures (Acatech, 2011; Wang et al., 2015).
CPMS can be distinguished from CPS by including production activities into key operational
processes. As CPS is equipped with advanced artificial intelligence and improved communication
capabilities, CPMS will render production activities more sustainable by reducing the need, time,
and cost for rebuilding and reprogramming manufacturing lines (Ribeiro & Björkman, 2018).
Therefore, CPMS can enable a more effective production process in terms of flexibility, reliability,
functionality, usability, and efficiency than traditional embedded systems.
Table 1 5-C Structure
5C-Level

Description

Smart
connection

Integration of the physical devices connected in a communication network.

Data to
Information
Conversion

Conversion from monitored device data to information, in order to
understand them and apply to the physical world.

Cybernetic

Use of information for the device virtualization. It is also the level
responsible for the communication among assets.

Cognition

Functions of monitoring and prognostics for failure prediction and
maintenance optimization.

Configuration

Transmission from the virtual to the physical world, making the machines
self-adjusting and self-adaptive.
5

As a basic architecture model guideline for developing CPS for manufacturing applications,
the 5C architecture is proposed. The 5C architecture clarifies how to construct a CPS from the
initial data acquisition to analytics, as well as to the final value creation by using a sequential
workflow manner (Lee et al., 2015). The details of the 5C architecture can be found in Table 1.
1.2.2

Insider Threats
Insider threats are considered one of the most challenging cyber security issues because

they are hardly detected or prevented by commonly employed security mechanisms. Insiders are
individuals who have access to and knowledge of a system, and they are also trusted within the
security perimeter. Accordingly, insider threats refer to actions that these insiders intentionally or
unintentionally misuse or abuse access/knowledge to violate the security policies of the system
(Homoliak et al., 2019).
The definition of insider threats differs depending on insiders' intentions. For example,
some definitions—such as “harmful acts that trusted insiders might carry out” and “the intentional
misuse of computer systems by users who are authorized to access those systems and networks”—
limit the scope of insider threats to intentional insiders. On the other hand, other definitions—such
as “threats originating from people that have been given access rights to an IS and misuse their
privileges, thus violating the IS security policy of the organization” and “an individual with
privileges who misuse them or whose access results in misuse”—include both intentional and
unintentional insiders (Greitzer et al., 2011; Hunker & Probst, 2011; Schultz & Shumway, 2001;
Theoharidou et al., 2005).

6

However, unintentional insider threats cannot be ignored from manufacturing system
security because these can damage the system as much as intentional insider attacks. Also, it is
plausible that insiders become a bridge between outside attackers, thus compromising confidential
system domains (Sinclair & Smith, 2008). Moreover, anyone who is able to access the systems—
such as suppliers, outsourcing human resources, or even third-party vendors—could turn into a
malicious insider. According to the 2016 California Data Breach Report, Target, the eighth-largest
retailer in the United States, was hit with a credit card data breach by a third-party vendor, which
resulted in 7.5 million customers' credit card information leakage in 2013 (Bishop et al., 2014).
The attacker obtained access to Target’s customer service database by using credentials stolen
from the third-party vendor.
In this research, an insider is defined as “anyone who has been or is affiliated with a system
but can intentionally or unintentionally compromise the system security.”
Table 2 Insider Category
Intention

Title

Motivation
To gain financial profit

Malicious Destructor
To express revenge
Voluntary
To express boredom
Hazardous Misuser
To express disgruntlement
To obtain unauthorized software
Dangerous Tinker

To check the system weakness

Involuntary

Unintentional mistake
Naïve Mistaker
Ignorance

7

Accordingly, insiders can be categorized into voluntary insiders and involuntary insiders.
Furthermore, each category can be delineated by their motivations: malicious destructor,
hazardous misuser, dangerous tinker, and naive mistaker. Different kinds of insiders and their
motivations are presented in Table 2 (Pfleeger, 2008; Stanton et al., 2005).
1.2.3

Blockchain
The blockchain is a way to store data in a distributed system in which the system

components have connected each other and form a Peer-To-Peer network. The main function of
the blockchain is to store the exact same data to all the components in the network, as well as link
the old data and new data to maintain the entire data integrity. Because of the connection between
old and new data, the modification of the old data in the specific node affects its new data integrity,
so any changes in the data could be readily detected by other components and prevented by using
consensus algorithms, without inspecting the entire stored data. However, it is inefficient to store
the data itself in all the components, because the cumulative data size would be enormous with the
given time, while the component's storage size is limited. Therefore, when the node is received,
generating, and transferring data, it automatically creates a transaction hash, which consists of 64
digits (Bitcoin) or 66 digits (Ethereum) of a random series of letters and numbers. The transaction
hash is a cryptonized identification of the data based on the data’s value, timestamps, creator
information etc. The transaction hash will not be directly distributed to the system components,
but it will be distributed as a block form that contains many other transaction hashes. The block
also has a block hash, which is an identification of the block, and it is distributed to the components.
This distributed block will be chained with the previous distributed block by involving the previous
block hash, and this is called the blockchain.
8

1.3

The Problem
Insider threats can be considered as one of the most challenging security issues in CPMS

because it is hardly detected or prevented by commonly employed security mechanisms.
Furthermore, a fully integrated system structure of CPMS's digital and physical domains will allow
insiders to inflict massive damage by manipulating small changes in manufacturing parameters.
Therefore, insider threats must be addressed and resolved prior to fully manifesting CPMS in the
real world. The main problem that this research address is stated as follows:
An insider threat risk in CPMS is enlarged due to the increased accessibility and
connectivity, and it is difficult to detect or prevent in a timely fashion.
The consequences of insider attacks can be enlarged from the sheer volume and
pervasiveness of exchanged data and increased accessibility of the system (Song & Moon, 2020c).
Moreover, a cross-domain integration between digital data and physical domains enables certain
attacks such as cyber-physical attacks—that are initiated from the digital format but result in
physical damages. This type of attack can be easily exploited by insiders since they have legitimate
access authentications to the digital domains.
Besides, legitimate access authentications enable insiders to hide their digital footprint,
such as event logs, browsing histories, and any surveillance history data (Song & Moon, 2020a).
Additionally, since insiders are knowledgeable about the system, they can easily bypass or
incapacitate any security process and compromise the system without being discovered.
Also, it is plausible that insiders unintentionally become a bridge between outside attackers,
thus compromising confidential system domains. Social engineering attacks—such as phishing,
SMSishing, baiting, fake software—are deceiving individuals or enterprises to accomplish certain
actions that benefit attackers (Greitzer et al., 2014; Salahdine & Kaabouch, 2019).
9

Furthermore, the growth of collaborative business in the manufacturing industry blurs the
boundary between insiders and outsiders (Schultz, 2002). Thus, it is now difficult to decide who
are insiders in the system.
Lastly, merely increasing supervised control and restrictions of the systems can result in
less flexibility, which can contribute to decreasing productivity (Sinclair & Smith, 2008).
1.4

Hypothesis & Objectives
To overcome gaps in the literature and advance the understanding of insider threats, as well

as blockchain implementations in manufacturing systems, the research hypothesis of this thesis is
as follows:
A service-oriented blockchain augmentation can reduce insider threat risks in CyberPhysical Manufacturing System, while remaining its flexibility and productivity.
Systems based on the blockchain have a limited system performance due to the arbitrary
block generation time and block occurrence frequency. The service-oriented blockchain
augmentation provides physical and digital entities with the blockchain communication protocol
through a service layer. In this way, multiple entities will be integrated by the service layer, which
will provide the services with less arbitrary delays, while retaining its strong security from the
blockchain.
Accordingly, all of the insiders’ digital footprints will be retained in the blockchain and
continuously validated by other participants. Thus, the blockchain communication protocol can
help prevent insiders from hiding their digital footprints.
Also, it is hard to exploit social engineering attacks to compromise the system protected
by the blockchain. To damage the system with the attacks, outsiders require computing power
10

more than 50% of the power of entire blockchain participants’ machines, or need to compromise
and manipulate more than half number of the machines' blockchain repository. However, such an
attempt is not practical, so it is fruitless.
For the ambiguity between insiders and outsiders, since all the services of the digital and
physical entities will be provided through the service layer, the system can be protected from
anyone who can access the systems.
Lastly, multiple independent service applications can be enabled and customized in the
service layer, hence the flexibility and productivity of the CPMS can be ensured.
To validate this hypothesis, the objectives of the proposed work are:
i) To investigate the influence of insiders, their potential threats, attack motives, and
vulnerabilities in CPMS.
ii) To develop and validate a physical testbed that represents a small-scaled CPMS
augmented by blockchain technology.
iii) To design and evaluate insider attack scenarios via the physical testbed and an
assessment framework.
iv) To quantify systematic differences between CPMS's operations with non-blockchain
and blockchain to isolate the effectiveness of the distributed system against insider threats.
1.5

Dissertation Overview
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literatures

related works on CPMS, insider threats, and blockchain. Chapter 3 presents a survey regarding
blockchain applications for manufacturing systems. Chapter 4 proposes and describes an Insider Threat
Tolerant Cyber-Physical Manufacturing System (ITTCPMS). Chapter 5 introduces two example
models for simulations: Layer Image Auditing System (LIAS) and Secure Programmable Logic
11

Controller (SPLC). Chapter 6 discuss insider attack scenarios by developing Insider Attack Tree (IAT).
Chapter 7 provides an Insider Attack Scenario Assessment Framework (IASAF) and four case studies.
Chapter 8 summarizes the dissertation and outlines the limitations and future work.

12

Chapter 2. Review of Literature

The review of literature consists of three key topics and presents the recent
acknowledgments and findings in this interdisciplinary research. For Cyber-Physical
Manufacturing System, its overview is introduced including definitions as well as technical and
security challenges. Next, insider threats are reviewed by examining reports, regarding insider
threats in the manufacturing industry, from various security organizations. After that, the efforts
to identify insiders in the systems are presented. Finally, blockchain's basic concept and its
applications in the manufacturing industry with advantages and challenges are provided.
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2.1
2.1.1

Cyber-Physical Manufacturing System
Definition
In recent years, the development of new paradigms for manufacturing systems has been

accelerated by the increased demand for more personalized, smart, and sustainable products with
the rapid growth of the industrial internet and cyber-physical technologies (Moghaddam et al.,
2018). For example, Cyber-Physical System (CPS) that integrates the computational entities
within intensive connections of the surrounding physical world provides data-accessing and dataprocessing services available on the internet (Acatech, 2011). CPS differs from traditional
embedded systems with wireless sensor networks because it is a heterogeneous system that
contains diverse networks, which integrate interconnected sensors, actuators, and controllers (Yu
et al., 2017).
Accordingly, as a fundamental base for an intelligent manufacturing environment, CPS is
introduced to a shop floor of a manufacturing system to provide numerous advantages in the
manufacturing process (Liu & Jiang, 2016). Furthermore, today’s manufacturing systems can be
transformed into the systems of Industry 4.0 with significant economic potential by integrating
CPS with production, logistics, and services within the current industrial practices (Lee et al.,
2013). Consequently, research and applications of CPS for manufacturing systems have been
active, which has positively affected the manufacturing industry in the form of Cyber-Physical
Manufacturing Systems (CPMS) in process automation and control (Wang et al., 2015).
CPMS is a vision of Industry 4.0 in which digital and physical domains are seamlessly
integrated via internet or computer networks (Song & Moon, 2020c). Thus, all the necessary
manufacturing entities in CPMS—such as production facilities, warehousing systems, logistics,
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and even social requirements—can be integrated to establish the global value creation via
advanced networks (Frazzon et al., 2013).
In order to achieve the goal of Industry 4.0, CPMS should follow three key features: (i)
horizontal integration of manufacturing processes, (ii) vertical integration of different hierarchical
levels, and (iii) end-to-end digital integration across the system's value chain (Wang et al., 2016).
CPMS will enable improved flexibility and robustness with the highest quality standards in the
entire production process, including engineering, planning, manufacturing, as well as operational
and logistics processes (Kagermann et al., 2013). This will lead to the development of a total of
five intelligent functions of CPMS: Self-monitoring, Self-awareness, Self-prediction, Selfoptimization, and Self-configuration (Song & Moon, 2019a). As a result, CPMS allows direct
communications within the system, thereby solving problems and making adaptive decisions in a
timely manner (Zhong et al., 2017).
2.1.2

Challenges
Many researchers have devoted time to develop and advance CPMS for Industry 4.0;

however, there are still technical and security challenges to be solved.
2.1.2.1 Technical Challenges
For CPMS's operation, all of the manufacturing-related data—such as system elements,
flow, and business specifications—are required to be collected. In the actual production process,
a sheer volume of images and information from automation systems and control systems are
created and gathered to be analyzed and processed. Particularly, the most complex and
cumbersome information data is returned from the overall production management, such as the
quality management, process monitoring, fault detection, etc. (Cheng et al., 2018). Therefore, data
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analytics in CPMS faces great challenges in the scalability, because of the strict requirements on
computation, speed, and variety with regard to the vast amount of data (Bi & Cochran, 2014). This
challenge necessitates Big-Data storage that is decentralized, scalable, elastic, and fault-tolerant
(Kambatla et al., 2014).
Also, there are technical challenges in integrating the physical domain based on Internet of
Things (IoT). IoT requires complicated heterogeneous networks, which include the connection
between various types of communication technologies (Xu et al., 2014). However, the lack of
powerful tools still poses a major hindrance to accommodate the variety of communication
technologies and applications in the network (Xu, 2011). Besides, in order to examine the massive
volume of data generated from the physical domain in a timely manner, it is important to develop
and improve data analytic techniques (Chen, 2017). Moreover, merely collecting data from a lot
of IoT devices efficiently is challenging due to the uncertainty and randomness of the network
distribution (Liu et al., 2008). The numerous different links and interactions between the devices
makes it a more complex system (Li et al., 2014). The IoT's visions in CPMS has great potential,
but many technical, social, and economic questions remain unaddressed (Hodges et al., 2013).
2.1.2.2 Security Challenges
CPMS promises great benefits in production flexibility, capability, and cost efficiency, but
realizing CPMS fully is not feasible without tackling security issues accompanying the higher level
of connectivity and accessibility (Wu & Moon, 2018). Particularly, Cyber-Physical Attack—that
originates from the cyber domain but induces physical damages—has become an emerging serious
threat to the manufacturing industry (Chhetri et al., 2016).
The most well-known Cyber-Physical Attack occurred in 2010. Iran's nuclear facilities
identified the Stuxnet computer worm, which was specifically targeting the Siemens control
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system and re-configuring PLC's programming-language-layer directly (Langner, 2011). In
Germany in 2014, the access authority of German Steel Mill's industrial control system was
compromised by multiple attackers. The attackers used malicious attachments in emails to
manipulate the access authority. The attack imperiled the blast furnace control system, which
resulted in access denial for all users, ultimately causing significant damages (Oueslati et al., 2019).
Lastly, Norsk Hydro, the largest aluminum producer in Scandinavia, experienced a production halt
due to a ransomware attack on the 19th of March 2019. These malware programs are designed to
compromise access control of the system and encrypt sensitive data on infected devices to stop the
manufacturing operation (Aoyama et al., 2020).
Apart from the Cyber-Physical Attack, the new technologies and requirements of CPMS
create new demand for standardization, which is the significant feature to improve security and
safety across different regions and communities. However, existing approaches regarding security,
safety, and legal standards are insufficient to meet the requirements charged by CPMS (Bicaku et
al., 2018). Furthermore, there is no standard communication protocols for the industrial devices
commonly employed. Therefore, their manufacturing operations tend to be inflexible and
inefficient, and this leads to limiting the full potential of CPMS implementation (Pereira et al.,
2017). To secure the use of new technologies and services, information security and data privacy
protection are thoroughly examined and investigated; particularly the difficult security issues
resulting from IoT implementation are inherent in IoT deployment, mobility, and complexity (Li,
2017). For instance, a tremendous amount of personal and private information would be
automatically collected when IoT is fully implemented into CPMS. Thus, protecting privacy in the
network environments becomes a more critical issue because the number of attack vectors and
surfaces on CPMS is much larger (Xu et al., 2018).
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Notably, insider threats are severely hazardous to any manufacturing system’s security, but
their risks are even more exacerbated against CPMS's security (Song et al., 2020). Insiders are
one of the most difficult attackers to deal within CPMS because Insider threat is a complex problem,
which involves computational and physical elements with human factors (Chinchani et al., 2005).
This means insiders can exploit the advantages of CPMS to maliciously compromise or manipulate
a system, which can result in deleterious consequences to the manufacturing system. More details
of insider threats are discussed in the following section.
2.2

Insider Threats
The ancient Roman's question—Who will guard the guards themselves?—alludes to the

notion that insider threats are perpetual problems in all aspects of real-world system security
(Bishop et al., 2014). In the past, insider threats have mainly been discussed among information
and computer system communities, who found that intentional insider misuse of information
systems resources can be a significant threat to organizations (D’Arcy et al., 2009). As
developments of modern global economic and technological infrastructure contribute to an
increasingly turbulent and dynamic environment for organizations, the use of information systems
has been widespread (Warkentin & Willison, 2009). However, at the same time, their internetbased mechanisms for global interactions introduced a greater vulnerability to the information
systems. Researchers of the information security area evaluated that nearly half of intrusions and
security violations occur by insiders (Crossler et al., 2013).
Meanwhile, advances in automation and network technologies have enabled the
manufacturing industry to take a step forward towards Industry 4.0, and its manufacturing system
has become a newcomer in recognizing the gravity of insider threats (Song & Moon, 2020a).
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2.2.1

Reports from security organizations
In this section, security reports regarding insider threats in the manufacturing industry are

presented.
2.2.1.1 National Insider Threat Task Force (NITTF)
National Insider Threat Task Force (NITTF) was established to forge insider threat
detection and prevention programs and to assist federal agencies in developing and implementing
these programs in October 2011. In their report, entitled "Protect Your Organization from the
Inside Out: Government Best Practices," NITTF defines insider threats not only in terms of
information assets or technology but also physical assets as follows: "The insider threat is the risk
an insider will use their authorized access, wittingly or unwittingly, to harm their organization.
This can include theft of proprietary information and technology; damage to company facilities,
systems or equipment; actual or threatened harm to employees; or other actions that would prevent
the company from carrying out its normal business practices (NIFFT, 2016)."
Also, to provide executive branch departments and agencies with guidance handling insider
threats in organizations, NIFFT published "Insider Threat Guide 2017" that offers direction in
implementing the basic building blocks of insider threat programs with major categories of the
minimum standards, including: i) Designation of Senior Officials, ii) Program Personnel, iii)
Access to Information, iv) Employee Training and Awareness, v) Monitoring User Activity on
Networks, and vi) Information Integration, Analysis, and Response (NIFFT, 2017).
2.2.1.2 CERT National Insider Threat Center
CERT, the national insider threat center, at Carnegie Mellon's Software Engineering
Institute (SEI) focuses on the following items: incident response, network situational awareness,
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malicious code analysis, secure coding, resilience management, insider threats, digital
investigations and intelligence, workforce development, DevOps, forensics, software assurance,
vulnerability discovery and analysis, and risk management (CERT, 2017).
CERT also perceived insider threats from two points of view. To identify the organizational
management practices that impact the frequency of cyber-related information theft and physicalrelated sabotage, CERT conducted an organizational survey. The samples that were used to derive
the survey of perceived organizational support are from employees, workers, and clerks from
various industries as well as manufacturing. From the survey, CERT shows that there is a negative
correlation between perceived organizational support and intentional (primarily malicious)
counterproductive work behaviors (Moore et al., 2016).
To inspect the problem of insider threats that impact organizations across all industries, the
above effort was extended in "The Common Sense Guide to Mitigating Insider Threats" (CERT,
2019). These guidelines are based on over 1,500 cases of insider threats from their database.
2.2.1.3 IBM
IBM has been publishing annual security reports based on their client information since
2015 (IBM, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020b), and insider threats have always been discussed
in these reports. IBM defines an insider as anyone, who has physical or remote access to a
company's assets; they could be employees of the company but also be third parties, such as
business partners, clients, or maintenance contractors (IBM, 2016).
Particularly, inadvertent insiders, who are unknowingly the primary source of a security
incident through their unaware or negligent actions, are focused on because they were responsible
for more than two-thirds of total security incidents in 2017 (IBM, 2017). There are three
representative malicious behaviors from the inadvertent insiders: i) falling for phishing scams or
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social engineering, ii) improperly configuring systems, servers, and cloud environments, and iii)
foregoing or sharing passwords (IBM, 2019). Moreover, According to the survey among 204
benchmarked organizations from 2019 to 2020, insider threats by inadvertent insiders take 63
percent of the total number of incidents, and the annualized cost was $4.58 million (IBM, 2020a).
2.2.1.4 GURUCUL
GURUCUL, which is a global cybersecurity company, started publishing insider threat
reports beginning in 2019. According to the survey at the 2019 RSA conference, the manufacturing
industry is the most vulnerable industry against insider threats, and 40% of insider threats in the
sector could not be detected initially, nor detected after the data had been breached (GURUCUL,
2019). In the 2020 survey, more than 68 percent of respondents from various industries answered
that their organizational systems are vulnerable to insider attacks, and also, they confirmed that
insider attacks are becoming more frequent compared to the past 12 months (GURUCUL, 2020).
These results show a significant increase in the 2021 survey with the same respondent
demographics; Almost all respondents answered that they experienced insider attacks in the past
12 months and consider increasing access control with unified visibility across all organizational
entities (GURUCUL, 2021).

2.2.2

Insider Threat Risk Assessment Models
In an early stage, to tackle the risk of insider threats in a manufacturing system, risk

assessment frameworks have been a focus of increased attention by researchers. Since the
appropriate countermeasures can be established by identifying tactics and strategies of an
adversary, many insider threat risk assessment models have been proposed (Chinchani et al., 2005).
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To identify a method that effectively analyzes threats for any organization, the author
(Hashim et al., 2018) analyzed the features of various insider assessment frameworks, including
NIST, FRAP, OCTAVE, and CRAMM. According to the paper, NIST assesses the risk of insider
threats in qualitative and quantitative ways, which is more dynamic and suitable for organizations
to estimate the impact of risk (Nostro et al., 2014).
Furthermore, when an access control system examines access requests, threat likelihood is
also one of the important elements that should be taken into consideration. To compare and
calculate the likelihoods of insider threats, a new approach that can qualitatively and quantitatively
evaluate the security and integrity of the subjects has been proposed (Boulares et al., 2017). To
validate the approach, the author defined formulas by summarizing and comparing examples,
which take different variables.
Although proposed methods have been used to detect insider threats, they can be
discovered after the damage occurred. To address this drawback, a risk assessment methodology
that evaluates the level of insider threats before the attack occurs has been proposed (Ahmad et al.,
2014). Compared with previous works, it assesses the risk of insider threats in a practical and
quantitative way. In this methodology, companies are able to compute a Threat Score (TS) based
on the attributes and behaviors of each employee and the vulnerability of an employee’s equipment.
Moreover, due to the increasing number of insider attacks that have been launched by disgruntled
or unsatisfied employees, the methodology creatively adds psychological indicators into the
behavior assessment.
Also, it is pointed out that a severe challenge exists in Information and Communications
Technology (ICT) organizations (Nostro et al., 2014, 2013). To identify insiders and mitigate the
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possible threats, the author proposed a methodology, which considers socio-economical aspects,
an attack’s impact on the entire system, and possible countermeasures into consideration.
2.3

Blockchain
Blockchain technology's innovative defensive mechanism has been widely publicized after

Satoshi Nakamoto proposed bitcoin in 2008 (Nakamoto, 2009). However, the foundational
concept of the blockchain, a distributed database, was proposed in the late 1970s (Sherman et al.,
2018). Specifically, the concept includes the idea of conserving all transactions with all the
modification histories to the collected data, which is the core algorithm principle of the modern
blockchain. Ralph C. Merkle proposed a Merkle Hash Tree, which can immutably chain blocks of
information with a cryptographic hash function; it becomes a blockchain's cryptographic technique
(Merkle, 1988).
Recently, blockchain technology has received significant attention in manufacturing
industry because it has a great potential to sustainably augment future manufacturing systems and
eliminate security challenges related to it (Lee et al., 2019). In this section, the proposed blockchain
applications for manufacturing systems are presented, and advantages of the blockchain
implementation into manufacturing systems are described as well as its challenges.
2.3.1

Advantages
One of the most significant merits of the blockchain implementation in manufacturing

systems is that blockchain can guarantee the production credit and the balance of profits without a
highly trustworthy third party (Liu et al., 2017). Particularly, blockchain can be used to establish
a secure Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communication (Yin et al., 2017). In CPMS, M2M
communication, including Machine-to-Cluster(M2C), are both key technologies to realize CPMS's
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innovative features, and it is vulnerable to Cyber-Attacks (Kim et al., 2010). Although the
communication can be less efficient if its form is changed from a centralized system architecture
to a decentralized system architecture, M2M communication can be trusted within the system
areas—public networks area, device area, and private area (Yin et al., 2017).
Moreover, by developing systems based on the decentralized system architecture, CPMS
makes further improvements in service value and maximizes the benefits of all stakeholders in the
value chain of manufacturing, as well as manifests the integration of decentralized manufacturing
resources (Zhang et al., 2017). Accordingly, the vision of industry 4.0 indicates that a majority of
manufacturing systems is changing from integrated and centralized systems to shared and
distributed systems (Li et al., 2018).
The blockchain can help manufacturing systems by overcoming critical challenges
regarding the data exchange among system entities and eventually supporting a consistent data
flow along the production chain (Frey et al., 2019). Recent developments in blockchain technology
show that it can support the development of sharing economy use cases and provide a promising
solution for establishing and maintaining trust by storing production information in an immutable,
distributed ledger (Geiger et al., 2019).
2.3.2

Challenges
However, implementing blockchain in manufacturing systems presents many challenges

due to the systematical differences between existing blockchain platforms and manufacturing
system architecture (Song & Moon, 2020c). The main challenges of applying the blockchain to
CPMS can be learned from the actual implementation in the industry (Dorri et al., 2016). Since
the public blockchain cannot be owned by any central authority, the node management on the
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network is an issue. For instance, it is difficult to detect and validate malicious external participants.
Furthermore, the smart contract structures cannot enforce participants to follow the contract terms
and conditions, which is critical to the manufacturing industry (Dorri et al., 2017). Also,
implementing the blockchain to the real business logic would not be always feasible, due to legacy
equipment still being used in the current manufacturing system (Lee et al., 2019). Besides, there
are still attack threats that are specially targeting decentralized systems, such as 51% attack and
Decentralized-Denial-of-Services (DDOS) (Natoli & Gramoli, 2016). However, such attacks
require much more computing powers and resources to initiate and implement the attacks, and thus
may occur less frequently than other Cyber-Attacks; more analysis is required so that
countermeasures can be prepared.
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Chapter 3. Blockchain Technology in Manufacturing Systems

This chapter covers how manufacturing systems in literatures have adopted blockchain
technology while maintaining their production capacity, flexibility, and cost-efficiency. In order
to methodically approach the subject matter, five categories of manufacturing systems—CyberManufacturing System, Supply Chain Management, Internet of Things, Cloud Manufacturing, and
Additive Manufacturing—all striving to achieve the goal of Industry 4.0 are defined and exploited
to provide a system model-based analysis. Also, a technology roadmap—that visualizes the
chronological history of the technology—has been adopted to present the research trend and
identify opportunities for future studies.
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3.1

Blockchain Research Trend in Manufacturing Systems
The development of a new paradigm for manufacturing systems has been accelerated by

increasing demand for more personalized, smart, and sustainable products with the rapid adoption
of the industrial internet, 3D printing, and cyber-physical technologies (Moghaddam et al., 2018).
However, such a system ushers in serious security challenges, due to its enlarged accessibility and
connectivity. Also, the sheer volume and pervasiveness of data allow system security more
vulnerable against insiders and outsiders (Song & Moon, 2020c; Wu & Moon, 2020).
To address such security issues in manufacturing systems, blockchain technology has been
proposed by numerous researchers (Khan & Salah, 2018). Blockchain technology is a new security
defensive mechanism based on a decentralized notion that brings new possibilities of security,
resiliency, and efficiency of various systems. It can enable manufacturing systems to have more
agile value chains, faster product innovations, closer customer relationships, and quicker
integration with the Internet of Things and Cloud Technology. In addition, a system can benefit
from the blockchain by lowering the cost of trade with a trusted contract monitored without
intervention from a third party (Ahram et al., 2017).
However, research regarding the use of blockchain technology in manufacturing systems
has only begun in the past few years. At the same time, the scope of related research has been
widened as a system architecture requires a different strategy for each unique system. As a result,
research results of using blockchain technology in manufacturing systems have been disseminated
through a wide range of different outlets. Therefore, it becomes difficult for researchers and
practitioners to keep track of all the new findings reported in various publications (Kasten, 2020).
To resolve this issue, a survey was developed and is presented to reveal how blockchain
technology has been studied and implemented into manufacturing systems. To methodically
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organize the survey, five categories of manufacturing systems striving to achieve the goal of
Industry 4.0 are identified. Different approaches using blockchain technology are classified to
provide system model-based analyses. Each system model's trend and strategy in employing
blockchain technology are discussed. Also, to present the trend of research of blockchain
technology in manufacturing systems, a technology roadmap—a visualization of the chronological
history of the technology—has been adopted. The technology roadmap can be used to define and
present a timeline for the development of future core technologies (Shim et al., 2019). The road
map is used to draw a conclusion that explains the research trend and presents opportunities for
future studies.
3.2

Literature Selection Methodology and Result
In order to develop a set of source bibliography with highly relevant papers on blockchain

applications in manufacturing systems, as well as efficiently perform an analysis of the
applications in depth, the three-step selection process was established and utilized in this survey.
The first step is a keyword screening, which acquires papers in a wider scope of the subject
by using a simplistic combination of keywords. Although this results in including some irrelevant
papers that do not concern the actual subject, collecting papers from a wider scope can prevent
papers that are highly related to the subject from being overlooked. The second step is a noise
screening that removes irrelevant papers generated from the first step. Considering the problem
statement and hypothesis of the paper, exclusion criteria based on the subject are applied to make
a choice decision in this step. At the same time, citations of the paper are also considered. Finally,
to analyze the acquired source bibliography thoroughly and provide a clear technology roadmap,
classification is conducted. All the papers in the source bibliography are classified to a
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manufacturing system type aiming at industry 4.0. The standards of the classification category are
i) a manufacturing domain of the system, ii) objective of the manufacturing system, and iii)
manufacturing operation process. From this step, the papers for minor manufacturing systems that
cannot form a cluster due to the low sample sizes are screened to highlight the most significant
papers connected to major manufacturing systems. The details of each step are described in the
following sections.
3.2.1

Step 1: Keyword screening
Two main keywords are applied to obtain a raw paper list regarding the blockchain

applications for manufacturing systems: Blockchain and Manufacturing. To collect potential raw
papers as much as possible, similar or related keywords—such as Block Chain, Shared Ledger,
Decentralized system, Decentralization cryptography, etc.—were also attempted, but did not
return distinctive results, and only resulted in noise papers.
For the search engine, Scopus with filtering only journal and conference papers was used,
and it resulted in 416 papers published between 2014 and 2021 (up to 5 February 2021).
3.2.2

Step 2: Noise screening
To identify and remove noise papers, the exclusion criteria were established and used for

Noise screening. The criteria are as follows:
•

Articles are not related to blockchain applications, concepts, techniques, or theories,

•

Articles are not related to manufacturing systems aiming at industry 4.0 or vision
of the future manufacturing systems,

•

Articles are not using blockchain technology to address issues regarding systems’
security.
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By using the above criteria, a total of 319 noise papers were identified and removed.
Afterward, a reference analysis was conducted on the 97 papers, and additional 12 papers were
found. Therefore, a total of 109 papers were selected as the source bibliography and used for the
survey.
3.2.3

Step 3: Classification
It is important to perform a survey by different categories of manufacturing systems to

provide a valid technology roadmap because the timelines for the development of technology differ
according to the system domains, objectives, and operation process. Meanwhile, from the
classification, a small number of papers that are not enough to represent a chronological history of
the technology should be removed. From the 109 papers, four papers were screened due to the
small group size, including: two papers about green manufacturing systems, one paper about power
grid systems, and one paper about agricultural manufacturing.
Finally, from the classification, five categories of manufacturing systems were identified
and used to conduct the analysis and develop the technology roadmap. Their categories and
classification results are presented in Table 3.
Table 3 Categories and Classification Result
System
Additive Manufacturing
Cloud Manufacturing
Cyber-Manufacturing System
Internet of Things
Supply Chain Management

Nomenclature

Paper#

AM
CM
CMS
IOT
SCM

9
12
36
24
24

The classification categories were created based on the standard introduced earlier, and
each category can be differentiated by the three standards. Details of each category of
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manufacturing systems are described in Section 3. Before that, brief quantitative analyses are
presented in Figure 1.

Figure 1 Publications by Categories
The figure shows that 34 percent of the blockchain applications are for CyberManufacturing System (CMS). Supply Chain Management (SCM) and Internet of Things (IOT)
take the same value of 23 percent, while Additive Manufacturing (AM) and Cloud Manufacturing
(CM) take 9 percent and 11 percent, respectively.
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Figure 2 Publications by Year
Seen from Figure 2, the number of publications has increased each year. Considering
that the papers were collected up to 5 February 2021, it is expected that the number of
publications in 2021 will be more than 2020. The blockchain application for CM was proposed
for the first time in 2016, but the number of SCM, IOT, and CMS surpassed CM after 2019.
3.3
3.3.1

Blockchain Implementation Strategies in Manufacturing Systems
Cyber-Manufacturing System (CMS)
CMS is a future vision for the manufacturing system, where physical components that are

fully integrated and seamlessly networked with computing processes, resulting in an on-demand,
knowledge-rich, communicable repository of manufacturing resource (Kasten, 2020; Shim et al.,
2019; Song & Moon, 2019b). Also, capabilities with optimal, sustainable manufacturing solutions
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can be enabled. The CMS paradigm was developed in response to recent advances on the Internet
of Things, cloud computing, fog computing, service-oriented applications, modeling and
simulation, virtual reality, embedded systems, sensor networks, wireless networking, machine
learning, data processing, automated manufacturing methods, and so on. By using these
technologies, manufacturing resources and capabilities can be sensed and linked directly or
through the Internet. Intelligent activities of manufacturing components and processes, such as
self-awareness, self-prediction, self-optimization, and self-configuration, are enabled by this
degree of interactions and communicative mechanisms (Song & Moon, 2017).
3.3.1.1 Challenges in CMS
However, manifesting fully functioning CMS is delayed due to the many challenges. First,
there is lack of standard for connection protocols among legacy manufacturing equipment.
Compared to existing internet-based systems in other industries, manufacturing machinery have
less connectivity, and even those entities have their own protocols that are not compatible with
other protocols, such as Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) (Song & Moon, 2020b). Moreover,
the majority of the equipment uses different types of sensors, hardware, and software, which leads
to different data formats and acquisition requirements. Also, a sheer volume of data being
exchanged in CMS causes other types of connection issues. The volume, velocity, and variety of
the generated data from physical and digital entities of CMS become an attractive target for inside
or outside intruders due to their pervasiveness (Wu & Moon, 2018). For these reasons, CMS
inadvertently ushers in critical cyber security challenges. Cyber-Attacks can exploit CMS's
vulnerable connections and enlarged attack surface from the data being exchanged in the system
to cause physical damage: Cyber-Physical Attacks (Chhetri et al., 2016; Lee et al., 2016). The
cyber security is one of the major hurdles in realizing fully functioning CMS.
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3.3.1.2 Strategies for CMS
Due to the lack of a standard for connection protocols, trust issues can occur in establishing
reliable partnerships without a highly trustworthy technology (Liu et al., 2017). Current connection
protocols are not able to enable secure communications among different heterogeneous physical
entities in CMS (Yin et al., 2017). To address this issue, blockchain technology can be
implemented to provide transparent and trustworthy standard protocol among organizations,
factories, or users (Durán et al., 2020).
Because of the asymmetry in exchanging data in CMS, there are challenges of ensuring the
ownership of the data as well as the data integrity by users or physical machinery of the system
(Frey et al., 2019). Besides, there is a lack of a secure and trusted digital infrastructure to efficiently
integrate entities that have different data format and acquisition requirements, thus it causes further
trust issues (Ouyang et al., 2019). Moreover, the continuous-growing diverse manufacturing data
hinders a practical and optimal solution to transmit all data via system networks (Leng et al., 2020).
Blockchain can help to process the unstructured manufacturing data by enabling transparent
sharing of manufacturing data within the CMS (Chung et al., 2019; Ho et al., 2019).
A sheer volume of data that is generated in CMS during the operation process is exchanged
in digital format through networks (Zhang et al., 2017). This results in a need for centralized data
centers, such as a cloud storage, which are unable to afford the corresponding management tasks
(Gu et al., 2019). Also, frequent data requests and provisions among many physical entities of the
CMS bring great challenges to the centralized database storage system in terms of storage capacity,
processing capabilities, and energy consumption (Li et al., 2019). To solve this issue, the
distributed system mechanism can be used to improve the efficiency of value interaction while
lower the cost.
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There were mainly four strategies used to implement blockchain technology into CMS:
Smart contract, Multi-chain, Platform, and Platform with smart contracts.
The smart contract is a set of codified clauses that enables communications with a certain
blockchain platform, specifically Ethereum. Ethereum protocol allows to conclude contracts
between agents for the execution of program logic, thus the smart contract is trackable, secure, and
unalterable (Mohamed & Al-Jaroodi, 2019). By using immutable self-logic codes, the smart
contract can be used to implement blockchain technology into CMS (Kapitonov et al., 2018).
The multi-chain structure achieves the data isolation of the system. At the same time, the
multichain structure can handle the high concurrent communication requirements of devices
belonging to different chains (Li et al., 2019).
An independent platform can exploit the advantage of a blockchain without the
modernization of legacy equipment (Chung et al., 2019). It can also be adopted to ensure both the
device-level data transmission and the manufacturing service transaction (Lee et al., 2020).
Furthermore, the platform constructed with smart contracts can be a breakthrough for
diverse manufacturing systems, where the requirement and resource information are embedded
and controlled by the smart contracts' self-logic codes (Yu et al., 2020).
3.3.2

Supply Chain Management (SCM)
Consultants first coined the term Supply Chain Management (SCM) in the early 1980s,

and it has been a focus of increased attention (Chen & Paulraj, 2004a). Supply Chain is a set of
entities and organizations involved directly or indirectly in the downstream and upstream flows of
services, products, information, and finances from source to customer and customer to source
(Mentzer et al., 2001). The Global Supply Chain Forum (GSCF) defines SCM as follows: "Supply
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Chain Management is the integration of key business processes from end user through original
suppliers that provides products, services, and information that add value for customers and other
stakeholders (Lambert & Cooper, 2000)." Accordingly, SCM describes both internal and external
logistics operations, as well as the preparation and management of materials and information flows
within an organization. It has also been used by researchers to explain strategic, interorganizational
problems, to explore an alternative organizational form to vertical integration, to define and
describe a company's relationship with its suppliers, and to address the purchasing and supply
perspective (Chen & Paulraj, 2004b).
3.3.2.1 Challenges in SCM
However, due to the fast and extreme development of advanced technology in
communications and operation logistics, SCM has also been undergoing drastic changes from its
initial status in manufacturing systems. For this reason, unprecedented new challenges in SCM
occurred. For example, there are trust issue in information sharing due to the shortcomings of
networked production, including delays, asynchronous data between different parties, a variety of
sharing methods, irregularity in control systems, and the risk of shared data being tampered with
or hidden (Li et al., 2020). Also, the growth of manufacturing system’s components within SCM
has resulted in high costs of management or even complete reliance on third-party manufacturers
(Bose et al., 2018). Furthermore, because of the lack of transparency, information on their
manufacturing processes is not easily shared. This absence of the information could put the supply
chain at risk. For these reasons, security of SCM can be weakened, and this will result in increasing
the risk of supply chain fraud, such as product counterfeiting, as well as any illegal activity
(Maroun et al., 2019).

36

3.3.2.2 Strategies for SCM
Establishment of trust among supply chain is the most important and challenged task in
SCM. Particularly, trust only can be extended to the surface-level visible without transparency
(Bhattacharyya & Smith, 2018). For this reason, in an increasingly global environment for
manufacturing supply chains, developing trust & transparency can be costly. Moreover, business
arrangements within SCM can face an unforeseen complexity and result in disputes between even
the most well-intentioned parties (ElMessiry et al., 2019). Therefore, SCM necessitates the
implementation of blockchain technology to improve transparency in the business networks. Since
the characteristics of blockchain technology can meet the demand for enhanced information
sharing and transparency in the networks, it is considered the key technical solution (Xu et al.,
2019).
The cost for processing documents and information for SCM is more than twice that of the
actual physical transportation. Such problems can be addressed by adopting a blockchain into the
supply chain ecosystem, in which event data and document workflows are frequently exchanged
(Bose et al., 2018). SCM can effectively reduce the delays and uncertainties in sharing the
information by decentralizing important information, including inventory levels, manufacturing
performance and operations indicators, as well as order and shipment information (Padalkar et al.,
2020).
Traditional SCM are operated in a particular condition that participants are isolated, thus it
cannot provide comprehensible provenance information (Appelhanz et al., 2016). This results in
shortcomings, including insufficient trust between parties, isolated data storage, and unsatisfactory
standardization in communication as well as low traceability in SCM (Abeyratne & Monfared,
2016). Moreover, since the growth of fully automated manufacturing systems requires high
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traceability in SCM (Westerkamp et al., 2018), it is important to solve the problem with an
adequate solution. Such a problem can be addressed by blockchain technology, which attributes to
enhance durability, transparency, immutability, decentralization, and verifiability of the system
(Altmann et al., 2020). Accordingly, by implementing blockchain technology in SCM, the
traceability of the supply chain can be improved (Westerkamp et al., 2020).
In addition to four main strategies from CMS, Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) is
added in SCM. TAM is an information systems theory that models the decision-making process
by which users may or may not adopt and implement new technology (Maroun et al., 2019). TAM
is based on various behavioral factors, such as cognitive usefulness, cognitive ease of use, user
attitudes, and behavioral intentions (Liu et al., 2020). The model can effectively exploit blockchain
technology to take advantage of decentralized systems (Bhattacharyya & Smith, 2018).
3.3.3

Internet of Things (IOT)
The term Internet of Things (IOT) was first introduced by Kevin Ashton in 1999 in the

context of supply chain management (Gubbi et al., 2013). IOT is a new model that is rapidly
gaining popularity in the modern wireless telecommunications scenario. The basic idea of this
concept is the pervasive presence around us of a variety of things or objects—such as RadioFrequency Identification (RFID) tags, sensors, actuators, mobile phones, etc. By specific
addressing schemes, these things or objects are able to communicate with each other and
collaborate with their neighbors to achieve common goals (Atzori et al., 2010). The main benefit
of the IOT concept is that it will have a high impact on several aspects of the daily life and behavior
of potential users. From a private user's point of view, the introduction of the IOT will be felt most
clearly in the work and home domains. In this context, robotics, assisted living, e-health and
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enhanced learning are just a few examples of application scenarios where new paradigms may play
a leading role in the near future. In the same way, from the perspective of manufacturing industry,
the most obvious consequences will be seen in the areas of automation of industrial manufacturing,
logistics, business/process management, and the intelligent transportation of people and goods
(Atzori et al., 2010).
3.3.3.1 Challenges in IOT
However, it necessitates adequate security measurement before it can be fully realized.
Current IOT devices have had high-risk vulnerabilities in security for a long time, due to enlarged
connections of IOT devices based on a centralized system (Cao et al., 2020). For instance, in 2016,
the Mira botnet, a US domain name resolution service provider, launched a DDOS attack on Dyn
(Dyn.com). By controlling a large number of IOT devices, this attack caused a large-scale network
disconnection in the eastern United States. Such attacks pose a significant risk to the protection of
user data and can result in data leakage. Also, because of the large amount of data from
independent devices cause the delays in data processing. Moreover, such risk produced a network
trust issues. IOT adopters are wary of technical partners that can grant system access and control
to authorities (e.g., governments, suppliers, or service providers), allowing them to capture and
analyze user data. As a result, the future IOT solutions should prioritize trust and anonymity (Li et
al., 2016).
3.3.3.2 Strategies for IOT
For a transparent IOT ecosystem, it is necessary to verify all the connected devices. As the
growth of the number of IOT devices within the system boundary, continuous management and
verification of these devices will cause a high cost (Bai et al., 2019). Also, to enable efficient
computing and communication capabilities among IOT devices, the sensors are connected with
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each other and with the manufacturing controllers—such as programmable logic controller and
SCADA—through the internet (Bhattacharjee et al., 2020). This makes IOT systems an attractive
target for Cyber Attacks. To address this issue, blockchain can be implemented into IOT system
to protect the device during its operation by validating its communications (Matheu et al., 2020).
A massive amount of data is constantly generated from IOT devices at high speeds, and it
is difficult to meet the processing time requirement (Lallas et al., 2019). Moreover, independent
systems that differ from each other can lead to complex integration (Assaqty et al., 2020). By
ensuring real-time, accuracy, and effectiveness, blockchain technology can provide privacy
preservation in data processing (Lin et al., 2020).
IOT facilitates cloud storage to process information data in a more systematic way, which
converts it into real-time actions and information (Díaz et al., 2016). Even though the use of cloud
storage is essential in IOT, there is a threat to data security, transparency and privacy (Iqbal et al.,
2020). To tackle this issue, data generated from IOT devices can be leveraged through blockchain
to reduce the high “trust tax” imposed on global users in IOT networks, including customers,
suppliers, distributors, governments, service providers, and other manufacturers that unnecessarily
trust each other (Zhang et al., 2019).
3.3.4

Cloud Manufacturing (CM)
Cloud Manufacturing (CM) is a computing and service-oriented manufacturing model that

was built from existing advanced manufacturing models and industrial information technology
with the help of cloud computing, IOT, virtualization, and service-oriented technologies (Tao et
al., 2011). CM aims to achieve maximum sharing and circulation, high usage, and on-demand use
of various manufacturing resources and capabilities by providing secure and dependable, high40

quality, low-cost, and on-demand used manufacturing services across the manufacturing lifecycle.
More specifically, using IOT technologies—e.g., radio frequency identification (RFID), wired and
wireless sensor networks, as well as embedded systems—various manufacturing tools and abilities
can be intelligently sensed and linked into the wider internet, and automatically managed and
monitored in a CM system. The manufacturing tools and abilities are then virtualized and
encapsulated into various manufacturing cloud services (MCSs) that can be accessed, invoked,
deployed, used on-demand using virtualization, service-oriented technologies, and cloud
computing technologies (Tao et al., 2011).
3.3.4.1 Challenges in CM
However, CM has trust issues to be solved. There is no technical solution to promote trust
among users in CM due to its systematical limitation from the centralized network architecture.
Existing models commonly use centralized networks and third-party management, which presents
a number of drawbacks, including trust issues. The centralized network not only diminishes the
CM's efficiency but also introduces shortcomings such as scalability and a fragmented
communication model. For this reason, any kind of Cyber-Attack can incur massive damage to the
system. Besides, certain physical machines in the manufacturing system could be located in
unsecured environments, therefore, they can be easily tampered with by intruders. Furthermore,
data is transmitted via a wireless network to a centralized database, which may be a security
vulnerability in the system (Li et al., 2018).
3.3.4.2 Strategies for CM
The development of advanced technology in CM allows customers instant pricing and
access to a large capacity of manufacturing nodes (Barenji et al., 2018). However, many of CM
systems exploit a centralized network with data flowing through an intermediary agent connecting
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clients with service providers (Hasan & Starly, 2020). The centralized network not only reduced
the productivity of the CM but also bring various flaws, including: scalability issues, a broken
communication model expose vulnerabilities against cyber-attack (Tao et al., 2011). In this regard,
blockchain technology can provide a potentially viable solution to this issue, thanks to its unique
validation process from a decentralized system architecture (Zhu et al., 2020).
3.3.5

Additive Manufacturing (AM)
Additive manufacturing (AM), also known as 3D printing and rapid manufacturing, is a

category of manufacturing technologies that can create complex objects by stacking layered
material automatically before a three-dimensional object is printed (Baumung & Fomin, 2018).
The majority of related AM technologies use powder or wire as a feedstock, which is selectively
melted by a concentrated heat source and then consolidated after cooling to form a component
(Herzog et al., 2016). Compared to subtractive manufacturing, AM can manufacture complex or
custom parts directly from a design without the use of costly tooling or shapes like punches, dies,
or casting molds, and it eliminates several machining steps. Also, by removing or reducing the
need for multiple component assembly, considerable manufacturing expense reductions can be
achieved. Moreover, parts may also be manufactured on demand, eliminating spare parts inventory
and reducing lead times for essential or out-of-date replacement parts (DebRoy et al., 2018).
3.3.5.1 Challenges in AM
However, AM's security concerns are growing due to the sheer volume and pervasiveness
of data and increased accessibility in the networks. Particularly, Cyber-Physical Attack has
become a serious threat to the AM operation. Since the infill structure of the 3D model is usually
generated during the conversion process of a CAD file to G-code by the third-party program, the
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process can be vulnerable to such attacks. Also, it is hard to detect the attack on infill structure
because interior defects can occur without affecting the exterior (DebRoy et al., 2018).
Accordingly, the challenges exist in authorized access to product data, assured supply of the agreed
quantity, distinction of original parts from counterfeits, as well as protection of intellectual
property, product liability, and warranty (Stjepandic & Biahmou, 2016).
3.3.5.2 Strategies for AM
As AM gain attention increasingly in many industries, the need to prevent counterfeiting
AM-produced parts increases (Kennedy et al., 2017). The counterfeit AM parts can pose a serious
issue because they appear similar to the original parts but have different infill structures. This
results in the lack of functionality or tensile strengths in the specific material composition of the
object, which may lead to part failure (Campbell & Ivanova, 2013). Blockchain technology can
provide a promising solution for acquiring reliability in the additive manufacturing process.
AM improves its production efficiency by remotely sharing digital information, such as
construction plans, CAD files, or material specifications to manufacture physical goods
(Kurpjuweit et al., 2021). However, significant challenges from compromised access
authorizations can cause the breaching of important data, such as product specification, assured
supply of the agreed quantity, intellectual property, as well as product liability and warranty
(Holland et al., 2017). Blockchain can help AM to overcome authorization issues, allowing them
to take advantage of decentralization-based security (Klöckner et al., 2020).
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3.4

Technology Roadmap

Figure 3 Technology Roadmap
To visualize strategies exploited by manufacturing systems to resolve their unique
challenges, a Technology Roadmap was developed. The Technology Roadmap can be helpful in
drawing a conclusion that identifies the research trends and opportunities for future studies.
Contract from Ethereum was also tried to manifest secure management systems, and it
became a component of a platform to provide more independent and stable services in SCM.
Platform development was the mainstream of the blockchain implementation strategies for IOT,
because it is efficient to conduct continuous verification on a large number of IOT devices. Also,
the smart contract was exploited to tackle data processing issues. Most of the applications for CM
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were based on the use of the smart contract. Especially, it was used to play the role of computing
protocol to provide more secure cloud service in the manufacturing industry. For AM, the smart
contract and platform were proposed to implement blockchain technology to ensure reliability in
the additive manufacturing process and access authorization issue.
Overall, manufacturing systems leveraged existing blockchain applications—mainly about
a financial trading system—to address their challenges in the early stage. However, these attempts
cause many challenges and limitations due to the systematical differences between financial and
manufacturing systems. Accordingly, a customizable platform with blockchain technology has
been published to handle such issues. In most recent, the smart contract from Ethereum was used
to compose and operate a platform to improve data processing efficiency, flexibility, and cost
deduction.
In conclusion, more and more blockchain platforms would be considered, developed, and
proposed to resolve current issues in the blockchain implementation. Hence, it is essential to
understand the effectiveness of the blockchain on reliability and performance in manufacturing
systems, and their potentials as manufacturing infrastructures must be properly reviewed. This will
contribute to identifying possible solutions for challenges in employing blockchain technology and
understanding the impact of various consensus algorithms and programming languages on the
blockchain's performance.
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Chapter 4. Insider threat tolerant Cyber-Physical Manufacturing System

In this chapter, an insider threat tolerant Cyber-Physical Manufacturing System augmented
by a service-oriented blockchain is proposed to overcome security vulnerabilities against insider
threats and technical limitations of blockchain technology. First, a discussion of how blockchain
technology can mitigate insider threat risks in manufacturing systems is presented. Afterward, a
service-oriented architecture (SOA), which motivated the development of a service-oriented
blockchain, is reviewed and explained to show how a service-oriented blockchain can enable
secure services while reducing redundant connections and optimizing system integration structures.
Finally, the insider threat tolerant Cyber-Physical Manufacturing System is introduced with the
example to help in understanding how blockchain technology can be implemented into the
manufacturing system to secure the system from insider threats.
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4.1

Blockchain and Insider Threats
As described in the previous chapter, blockchain technology has been of increased research

interest by many researchers to enhance the security of systems in various manufacturing sectors,
specifically for manufacturing systems aiming at industry 4.0 (AL-Salman & Salih, 2019). This
new paradigm of the security mechanism shows that it is feasible to realize industry 4.0 while
ensuring security against intruders. Additionally, blockchain technology can be a technical
solution to reduce insider threat risks in manufacturing systems.

Figure 4 Centralized and Decentralized System Structure
The main reason behind the unprecedented level of security of blockchain technology is a
decentralized system structure. Since all the participants in the blockchain networks share identical
data and validate each other, the attacker needs massive computing power, time, and resources to
successfully launch the attack (Sherman et al., 2018). Accordingly, it is difficult for insiders to
inflict insider threats, even though they can bypass or incapacitate the general security mechanisms
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by using their legitimate access authentication. For more details, the blockchain's decentralized
system structure can be explained by comparing it with a centralized system structure.
For manufacturing systems, the centralized system structure is based on the central control
server, which handles system data processing, conversion, storage, and management (Song &
Moon, 2020b). Only a limited access authentication for the central control server is allowed and
strictly managed because the entire manufacturing operation is configured by the server. Due to
its easy configuration, management, and direct control, many manufacturing systems adopt the
centralized system structure. Since all manufacturing information and data is controlled and
managed by the central control server, a manager or administrator of the system can easily
supervise and monitor the manufacturing process. This structure can also provide consistent
network environments by enabling stable and predictable communication protocol from the
centralization (Hatvany, 1985). Moreover, since every entity in the manufacturing systems is
connected and controlled by the server, efficient and optimized integration can be achieved. Thus,
it will bring drastic improvements in system performance and response speed.
Meanwhile, the decentralized system structure does not have a server or controller that
collectively manages overall system data. Instead, multiple independent entities in the system are
functioning as a central control server, and all the entities are connected and establish a
decentralized network. In this network, every entity possesses the same data and continuously
validates each other to maintain data integrity in the network. As a result, the decentralized system
structure's performance is reduced due to the inefficient data management processes. However,
such trade-off can be a potential solution for insider threat risks. In lieu of maximizing the system
performance, the decentralized based system structure gains reliability. Besides, the stability of the
network can be ensured because each entity in the network functions as an independent central
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control server. For instance, the attacker cannot incapacitate the system by attacking single target.
This can be demonstrated as follows.

Figure 5 Attack from Insiders
Seen from above, for the centralized system structure, if the malicious insider manipulates
the central control server, the data integrity will be compromised without being detected because
the insider has the legitimate access authentication or security clearance of the server. Furthermore,
this damage will directly affect and harm other entities in the system, because they are seamlessly
integrated via the internet and computer networks and always trust the central control server. For
this reason, manufacturing systems in industry 4.0 are vulnerable to insider threats, and their risks
are increasing.
On the other hand, the decentralized system structure can effectively reduce the damage by
using its own systematical architecture. Even though the malicious insider can still manipulate and
compromise the data in a certain entity, this damage will not directly be transferred to other entities
due to the continuous validation process of blockchain technology. In order to damage this system
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structure, the insider would have to attack more than 50% of entire entities simultaneously.
Therefore, the attack on the decentralized system structure takes more time, cost, and resources,
which enables the system to mitigate insider threat risks.
4.2

Blockchain Implementation
As mentioned earlier in Chapter 4, many researchers have explored blockchain technology

to increase the security of manufacturing systems, and a plethora of manufacturing applications
with the blockchain have been proposed. According to the survey of manufacturing applications
with the blockchain, numerous proposed systems adopted existing blockchain applications to
address their challenges. However, such implementations result in other problems because the
nature of manufacturing systems is based on the distributed system architecture, not decentralized
system architecture.
The decentralized system and distributed system are often used to indicate the same system
based on blockchain technology. However, the terms "decentralized' and " distributed" define
different system architectures.

Figure 6 Decentralized and Distributed System Architecture
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Seen from Figure 6, in the decentralized system, there is no single entity, which makes the
decision for the system operation. Instead, each entity decides its own behavior and actions, which
results in the entire system's behavior and performance. Also, since the connection among entities
is generally dynamic, it is easy to add a new entity to the system or remove the entity from the
system.
However, the distributed system's decisions are collaboratively made by multiple entities.
To provide the certain service, more than one entity can be digitally or physically connected and
integrated within the system. Therefore, the decision making for the system is more centralized
than for the decentralized system. For this reason, manufacturing systems are often based on the
distributed system architecture, rather than the decentralized system architecture. The digital and
physical entities of the system are integrated to provide various services of manufacturing
processes, such as production, quality control as well as resource and order management.
Conclusively, to implement blockchain technology into manufacturing systems without
systematical issues, a different approach is needed, and a Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA)
can be used.
4.2.1

Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA)
In addition to the systematical differences between the decentralized and distributed system

architecture, the demands and requirements for the rapid changes in the manufacturing industry
make it difficult to realize fully functioning blockchain manufacturing system. To overcome such
problems without compromising performances or cost, it is necessary to approach the problem
with a systematical viewpoint, and Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) can be a potential
solution.
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For integrating heterogeneous systems, SOA has been explored by many researchers to
integrate legacy systems' protocol and platform while remaining its flexibility, adaptability, and
simplicity (Xu, 2011). To improve the functionality of interoperable services and adaptability for
rapidly changing services, SOA is designed to provide services based on the integrated
components of the system.
A service can be considered as a process, which represents the functionalities of the system.
SOA can ensure adaptability to rapidly changing business needs by reusing and combining existing
services and system components (Iacob & Jonkers, 2009). Also, SOA can implement new business
applications by decomposing the existing applications into individual functions and reconstructing
them as new services. This enables the recursive aggregation of services, which can create new
business processes and publications (Unger et al., 2009). For example, discrete components of a
system can be re-composited and reconstructed to be reused for other services. Therefore, SOA
allows the system to create new services dynamically to satisfy rapidly changing business needs
(Quartel et al., 2009).
Accordingly, SOA can be exploited to implement blockchain technology into
manufacturing systems. Specifically, SOA can help to optimize and reduce redundant blockchain
communications by enabling blockchain protocol to the service. By applying these ideas and
concepts, Service-Oriented Blockchain (SOB) is developed to augment CPMS with blockchain
technology while remaining its flexibility, productivity, and cost-efficiency.
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4.2.2

Service-Oriented Blockchain (SOB)

Figure 7 Existing Blockchain Application
The decentralized-based architecture with blockchain technology can be a promising
solution to insider threats because it can establish a verifiable communication channel without 3rd
party, and insiders will continuously validate each other by using a consensus algorithm. However,
since each entity should participate in the blockchain network and communicate via the blockchain
protocol, every single data exchange in the system will be delayed due to the arbitrary block
generation time and block occurrence frequency. For this reason, the system will have limited
system performance. Moreover, since these redundant delays are created from the blockchain's
validation process, which cannot be replaced or removed, it is arduous to find technical solutions.
Moreover, since all the entities in CPMS are fully connected to enable collaborative manufacturing
services, the blockchain augmentation for individual entities is not suitable for the system.
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Figure 8 Service-Oriented Blockchain
A Service-Oriented Blockchain (SOB) solves such issues by providing physical and digital
entities with the blockchain communication protocol through service applications (Service 1,
Service 2, and Service 3), not directly applying the blockchain to individual entities. In this way,
multiple entities will be integrated by the service applications, which will enable the services with
less arbitrary delays while remaining their strong security from the blockchain. Also, the recursive
data transformations between the entities and blockchain can be effectively reduced, and the attack
surface is narrowed down to the service layer. Furthermore, new services can be dynamically
developed by recomposing, reconstructing, and reusing entities.
4.3

An Insider Threat Tolerant Cyber-Physical Manufacturing System
To overcome security vulnerabilities against insiders and technical limitations of

blockchain technology, an insider threat tolerant Cyber-Physical Manufacturing System
(ITTCPMS) augmented by a service-oriented blockchain has been proposed. The system consists
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of four layers: user layer, entity layer, service layer, and blockchain layer. Details of each layer are
discussed in the following sections.

Figure 9 Insider Threat Tolerant Cyber-Physical Manufacturing System
4.3.1

User Layer
Generally, users are not involved in system architectures, but they must be defined in the

insider threats research to investigate the influence of insiders and their potential threats. There are
three types of users: End-User, Providers, and Administrator. End-User, such as buyers, agents,
business partners, can access digital entities in the entity layer, while providers, such as
manufacturers, designers, examiners, can access to physical entities. The administrator manages
service layer and holds ground truths in the proposed system. It is assumed that all users in the
user layers are potential adversarial insiders. They can intentionally manipulate the manufacturing
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information or unintentionally reveal the accessible route into the system to outsiders. It is always
possible that they can exploit their accessibility and knowledge of the system.
4.3.2

Entity Layer
To investigate vulnerabilities in the system against insiders, a basic model of CPMS must

be included. The main system components will be placed in the Entity layer, which is the attack
targets for insiders. The entity layer consists of the digital entity and physical entity. The digital
entity includes manufacturing specification, operation parameters, resource, and order scheduling
management data, while the physical entity represents machines, sensors, and actuators. These
entities are seamlessly integrated through the internet and computer network to provide certain
services such as order management, production, and quality control.
4.3.3

Service Layer
The service layer is the most important layer in ITTCPMS, and it bridges between the entity

layer and the blockchain layer. The main objective of the service layer is to provide physical and
digital entities with the blockchain communication protocol through a service layer. In this way,
multiple entities will be integrated by the service layer, which will enable the services with less
arbitrary delays while remaining its strong security from the blockchain. Also, multiple
independent service applications in the service layer can ensure the flexibility and productivity of
the CPMS.
Additionally, it is assumed that the service layer is under trust management by the
administrator, who manages the service layer and can tailor the layer based on users’ needs and
entities’ requirements.
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4.3.4

Blockchain Layer
The blockchain is a way to store data in a distributed system in which the system

components have connected each other and form a Peer-To-Peer network. The blockchain's
decentralized system structure can offer an innovative decentralized and transparent transaction
mechanism (Leng et al., 2020). Figuratively, the blockchain consists of decentralized updated
blocks of data. Each block includes various information—such as a timestamp, difficulty, balance,
and list of transactions—with a link to a previous block. Also, the blockchain contains connected
historical data, which enables every transaction in the database to be traced back to the source
(Leng et al., 2021). For this reason, the blockchain can validate the data with each other within the
network participants without a third party (Li et al., 2019).
Accordingly, the above decentralized-base validation process makes the blockchain
immutable and reliable without a third party. Thus, all sensitive data can be stored in the blockchain
layer, and it can only be accessed through the service layer to ensure security against insiders.
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4.3.5

Example

Figure 10 Example of ITTCPMS
To help in understanding the proposed system, an example of ITTCPMS is developed and
demonstrated, and its layout can be found in Figure 10. The goal of the system is to operate the
manufacturing system in a safe environment established by SOB. The objectives of the system
operation are i) to integrate physical entities via a service application, ii) to enable validation
management within the service layer, and iii) to allow communications between the service layer
and blockchain layer.
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Manager—who establishes the system and is an administrator of the system—configures
the system entities in the entity layer before operating the system. It is assumed that the security
clearance for the configuration process is only limited to the administrator of the system. Insiders,
who are potential threats to the system, have a legitimate access authentication to the entity layer.
They can only operate the system with a permission from the manager, and all the activities are
recorded and monitored by the manager.
In the entity layer, digital entities and physical entities are integrated by the control system,
such as Distributed Control System (DCS), Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA),
and Programmable Logic Controller (PLC). Based on the production goal and purpose of the
system, the control system and integrated physical entities can be varied, as well as the scale of
the entity layer. On the basis of the number of services required by the system, multiple control
systems can exist in the entity layer, and physical entities can be dynamically decomposed and reorganized to provide flexible services. The control system is connected to the service layer to
validate input and output data through the blockchain layer.
There are four main conversion functions of the service layer: the information-to-data
conversion, data-to-transaction conversion, transaction-to-data conversion, and data-toinformation conversion. When configuration information arrives at the service layer, it is first
converted to data that can be manipulated and processed for the service. After the data processing
and validation for the service, it is converted to a transaction to be uploaded on the blockchain
layer. Once it is uploaded on the blockchain layer, the layer returns the transaction hash, which
functions like 'a key' to access the uploaded data. This transaction hash is delivered to the manager,
and the manager passes to the insiders for the system operation. When the input data with the
transaction hash by the insiders arrives at the service layer, the transaction hash is used to retrieve
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the corresponding transaction from the blockchain layer, and the transaction is converted to the
data to be processed in the service layer. In this way, the entity layer can continuously validate
input and output data via the blockchain layer, which is immutable and reliable against insider
threats.
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Chapter 5. Example Models and Validation

This chapter introduces two example models and their validation process. The two example
models of the insider threat tolerant Cyber-Physical Manufacturing System were developed: Layer
Image Auditing System (LIAS) and Secure Programmable Logic Controller (SPLC). These
models are explained in detail, and the discussion for each model is provided to describe how the
blockchain can help to mitigate insider threat risks in the general manufacturing practices.
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5.1
5.1.1

LIAS
Motivation
The realization of a fully automated manufacturing system for more productive, flexible,

and economical production is accelerated by recent technological advances. Specifically, an
unprecedented level of autonomy utilizing Additive Manufacturing (AM) has been adopted by
Cyber-Physical Manufacturing System (CPMS) (Lhachemi et al., 2019).
However, cyber-physical attacks—that originate from the cyber domain but result in
physical damages—has become a serious threat to the CPMS (Chhetri et al., 2016). Since the
cross-domain system structure of CPMS increases the attack surface and vectors, its system
properties are vulnerable to such an attack method. Any attackers from inside or outside of the
system can exploit this attack to perpetrate their malicious actions through various networks, due
to the increased accessibility and connectivity of the CPMS.
Especially in additive manufacturing processes, it is difficult to detect an attack on infill
structure because interior defects can occur without the exterior being altered (Sturm et al., 2017).
Thus, it is important to establish a defensive mechanism to detect or prevent such kind of attacks.
Previously, an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) was developed to identify an abnormality in the
cyber domain before physical damages occur. However, its high false alarm rate and long detection
timeline have been pointed out as critical limitations. To manage such an issue, augmenting IDS
with physical data auditing by correlating physical and cyber data has been proposed (Wu & Moon,
2020). This research showed that physical data auditing in real-time can be an effective solution
for preventing or detecting cyber-physical attacks.
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To detect the infill defectives by auditing physical data, layer images of the printing
objective can be used. Faulty detection systems based on image classification have been explored
by several researchers in various fields (Yan et al., 2020; Yue et al., 2020; Zhang et al., 2020),
although similar applications to AM have been a few. The main idea of auditing physical data is
to classify the layer images to detect defectives by using machine learning techniques.
However, the auditing process in CPMS is not free from cyber-physical attacks.
Particularly, machine learning systems themselves are vulnerable to an attacker, who can exploit
the adaptability of the system (Barreno et al., 2010). For example, the parameters of defensive
mechanisms augmented by machine learning can be exposed to various attack vectors due to the
enlarged attack surface of the CPMS. Specifically, such parameters can be easily targeted by
insiders, who has been or is being affiliated with the system: Insider Threats.
Insider threats are becoming one of the most difficult security issues for various fields—
such as financial, medical, public service, and manufacturing sectors—due to their virulence to the
system architecture that is dependent on computers and networks. In fact, the insider threat is a
serious problem across all respects of any real-world system where people trusted with access to
critical and sensitive information can abuse the access authentication to damage and compromise
the information; or collaborate with others to cause failures, losses and serious harms to the system.
To manage such risk, blockchain technology was incorporated into the machine learning
process (Song & Moon, 2020c). However, since the size of data being stored in the blockchain is
limited and its implementation and operation can cause extra cost, it is not practical to implement
the blockchain concept in the entire physical data auditing process.
To address these issues in adopting the blockchain to the auditing process, a Layer Image
Auditing System (LIAS) that incorporates a blockchain to protect the auditing process while
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maintaining high classification accuracy has been developed. LIAS employs multiple image
processing techniques to detect edges and a neural network to classify the layer image. To simplify
computations and reduce the machine learning parameters, LIAS equips a new filtering process
that does not require any kernels to acquire a clear edge of the layer images. Using the new filtering
process, LIAS can be trained by simulated images from 3D printing software and can test physical
images that are captured by a camera from the top of a 3D printer. Both training and testing images
were collected in different settings: non-defective type (normal) and five defective types (Center,
Top-Right, Top-Left, Bottom-Right, and Bottom-Left). The added level of security is ensured by
storing the weights and biases for the neural network in a block provided by the blockchain
environment.
5.1.2

Background
A layer-by-layer infill image detection system was previously developed to detect

malicious infill defects in the 3D printing process (Wu et al., 2017). To demonstrate forged
defective infill structure, simulated 3D printing process images were used by capturing the actual
printing processes from the top view of the 3D printer. For the experiments, the layer images were
captured in two groups: Defect and Non-Defect. For the classification, two machine learning
algorithms were used: Naive Bayes Classifier and J48 Decision Trees. Each algorithm classified
the images with 85.26% and 95.51% accuracy respectively. This method showed great potential
for future additive manufacturing security.
However, it also revealed the limitation of the use of machine learning for attack detection.
To train the supervised machine learning algorithm, it required a sheer volume of training data to
yield a meaningful classification performance. However, image data collection for training the
64

algorithm alone is not only wasting resources but also time consuming. Besides, since the layer
images can only be collected from the actual printing process, redundancy of data collection is
signified.
One way of addressing the problem is to use simulated images for training the machine
learning algorithm. However, due to the complex nature of photographs of real objectives, it is
difficult to expect high classification accuracy by training simulated images.
To enable simulated images as training data, more advanced machine learning techniques
are required, such as Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN). CNN can train the model with the
pattern of the image (Farabet et al., 2013; Krizhevsky et al., 2017). It can also assure enough
classification performances with simulated images by producing many convolutional layers and
conducting sub-sampling processes. However, CNN is an over-sophisticated and complicated
algorithm to classify infill layer images. Infill layer images are typically collected in a controlled
environment, and these are anticipated to remain in a certain quality.
However, CNN is devised to recognize visual imagery in various sizes of feature maps.
Also, CNN tends to remove abnormal patterns in the image to extract the overall pattern of images.
Thus, it is not beneficial to use to detect abnormalities in the images. Besides, CNN’s pixel-bypixel filtering process requires many computations with various types of kernels. Accordingly, a
myriad of parameters including kernels for the filtering process is required to run it: this can be a
critical security issue.
To protect the machine learning process, blockchain technology can be adopted. The
blockchain has been widely implemented in various industries to enhance system security (Azaria
et al., 2016; Lepoint et al., 2018; Mengelkamp et al., 2018; Nakasumi, 2017). These applications
have database structures based on the blockchain communication protocol to enable strong security
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in the processes of storing and retrieving data. Furthermore, there was an attempt to augment
CPMS's security by implementing the blockchain. The proposed system has a unique system
architecture to avoid redundant delay occurring from the blockchain's validation process. The
system consists of User Layer, Provider Layer, Service Layer, and Blockchain Layer. By
separating storing process from retrieving process in the manufacturing operation, users in the
User Layer and providers in the Provider Layer can share the ground truth in a secured way. To
show the effectiveness of the proposed system, the author demonstrated three physical data
auditing examples by using the proposed system. Even though the algorithm used for the examples
is simple, it shows high accuracy rates for attack detection and a quick response time (an average
of 0.122 seconds).
Additionally, blockchain technology has shown its potential for security enhancement in
machine learning. A Simplified Convolutional Neural Network (SCNN) has been proposed to
secure CNN from inside or outside attackers (Song, Shukla, et al., 2020). SCNN enables the
blockchain communication protocol in its machine learning process by uploading and retrieving
machine learning parameters on the blockchain. Since CNN is a fully connected deep learning
network model, a plethora of parameters are required to be stored in the blockchain. The problem
is the blockchain has a limited size of data being stored in one block, due to its cryptographic
algorithms. Therefore, CNN needs to be simplified to implement the blockchain into the machine
learning process. This research demonstrates that the potential of the blockchain application
enabling machine learning in a trusted environment.
Nonetheless, the proposed SCNN has critical limitations in terms of classification. Due to
the overly simplified algorithm, SCNN can only perform well in certain types of training and test

66

images. Besides, there is no clear network model and a specific application structure for the
blockchain implementation.
5.1.3

Architecture
LIAS consists of pre-processing and a Multilayer Perceptron Neural Network (MLP).

Unlike CNN, convolutional layers (𝐶𝐿1 , 𝐶𝐿2 ) are acquired by simply subtracting the feature 𝑥
from Padding Layers 𝑝𝑑, which are created from 𝑥. Since LIAS does not require any kernels and
uses padding layers of which size is the same with 𝑥, it requires much less computational power
than CNN does.
Each of the first padding layers 𝑝𝑑1 of size 500 × 500 × 8 (pixel) filters the feature 𝑥 1 and
generate the first convolutional layers 𝐶𝐿1. After that, 𝑅𝑒𝐿𝑈 is applied to the 𝐶𝐿1, and then these
eight layers are combined by taking the average value. Max Pooling is then used to produce 𝑥 2,
and the same steps are followed for 𝑥 2, except Average Pooling is used at the end. Finally, 2500
data from the Average Pooling are fed to MLP, which consists of 5 hidden layers and 6 output
layers. The architecture scheme of LIAS can be found in Figure 11.
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Figure 11 LIAS Architecture
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5.1.3.1 Pre-processing

Figure 12 Pre-processing Structure
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As shown in Figure 12, the pre-processing consists of five steps: the feature extraction,
first simple convolution filtering, max pooling, second simple convolution filtering, and average
pooling. The objectives of the pre-processing in LIAS are to extract outlines of the images and to
reduce the data points of the images. The simple convolutional filtering is used to obtain outlines
of the feature, and the number of data points is reduced by one-tenth from the max and average
pooling process.
In the first stage, the normalized feature is extracted from the image data, and the first
simple convolution filtering process will be conducted. The convolutional layer of LIAS is quite
different from CNN's because the layer image will always have the same scale of size. Thus, it is
not necessary to apply various kernel sizes with the stride values to produce sub-samples. Instead,
LIAS convolutional layers are primarily used to detect the edge of the image. More details of the
simple convolution filtering process will be explained below.
After the first filtering process, all the convolutional layers will be combined by using Max
Pooling image processing techniques and go through the second simple convolution filtering. By
conducting two rounds of the filtering process, LIAS can achieve clearer images as well as reduced
data volume.
The simple convolution filtering process algorithm is presented in Table 4. Due to the
padding layers 𝑝𝑑(𝑥), the simple convolution filter produces eight convolutional layers in a very
different way from the CNNs’ kernel filtering method. The kernel filtering method convolutes an
image by using a kernel with many dot product computations, but the simple convolution filtering
produces a convolutional layer by using a padding layer with one subtract computation. Since the
size of kernels (receptive field) is smaller than the original image to achieve precise filtering results,
a large number of the dot product computations are required based on the stride value—the
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distance between the receptive field centers of neighboring neurons in a kernel map. However,
since the padding layer has the same size as the original image, it enables only one subtract
computation to acquire the outlines of the original image. To accomplish this, padding layers are
constructed by: i) moving the feature’s values as many as offset value pixel by pixel to 8 inverse
directions, ii) filling zero values in an empty row or column, and iii) trimming the feature values,
which are out of the original feature range.
Table 4 Simple Convolution Filtering Process Algorithm
Given:
Feature, 𝑥 ∈ ℝ𝑚×𝑛
′
Upper diagonal matrix 𝑑𝑛×𝑛 and Lower diagonal matrix 𝑑𝑛×𝑛
,
0
0
𝑑= ⋮
0
[0

1
0
⋮
0
0

0
1
⋮
0
0

⋯
⋯
⋱
⋯
⋯

0
0
0
1
⋮ and 𝑑′ = 0
1
⋮
[0
0]

Padding Layer 𝑝𝑑(𝑥):
𝑝𝑑𝑇 (𝑥) = 𝑑 ∙ 𝑥,
𝑝𝑑𝐵 (𝑥) = 𝑑′ ∙ 𝑥,
𝑝𝑑𝑅 (𝑥) = 𝑥 ∙ 𝑑,
𝑝𝑑𝐿 (𝑥) = 𝑥 ∙ 𝑑′ ,

0
0
1
⋮
0

⋯
⋯
⋯
⋱
⋯

0
0
0
⋮
1

0
0
0
⋮
0]

𝑝𝑑𝑇𝑅 (𝑥) = 𝑑 ∙ 𝑥 ∙ 𝑑,
𝑝𝑑𝑇𝐿 (𝑥) = 𝑑 ∙ 𝑥 ∙ 𝑑′ ,
𝑝𝑑𝐵𝑅 (𝑥) = 𝑑′ ∙ 𝑥 ∙ 𝑑,
𝑝𝑑𝐵𝐿 (𝑥) = 𝑑′ ∙ 𝑥 ∙ 𝑑′.

Convolutional Layer 𝐶𝐿:
𝐶𝐿 = 𝑥 − 𝑝𝑑(𝑥)
Rectified Linear Unit 𝑅𝑒𝐿𝑈:
𝑅𝑒𝐿𝑈 = max(0, 𝐶𝐿)
Average 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛:
8

1
𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 = ∑ 𝑅𝑒𝐿𝑈𝑖
8
𝑖=1
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By using the padding layers, eight convolutional layers 𝐶𝐿 are generated by subtracting the
feature (𝑥) from eight Padding Layers (𝑝𝑑). 𝐶𝐿 includes: 𝐶𝐿1 (highlight a top side outliner), 𝐶𝐿2
(highlight a bottom side outliner), 𝐶𝐿3 (highlight a right-side outliner), 𝐶𝐿4 (highlight a left side
outliner), 𝐶𝐿5 (highlight a top and right side outliner), 𝐶𝐿6 (highlight a top and left side outliner),
𝐶𝐿7 (highlight a bottom and right side outliner), and 𝐶𝐿8 (highlight a bottom and left side outliner).
Rectified Linear Unit (𝑅𝑒𝐿𝑈) is then applied for all the layers to acquire clear outliners in
the images. To help understanding the concept, four samples of convolutional layers (Top, Bottom,
Right, and Left) are compared under two conditions: Before 𝑅𝑒𝐿𝑈 and After 𝑅𝑒𝐿𝑈. The result can
be found in Figure 13.
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Figure 13 ReLU Result
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For the pooling layers, a max-pooling is used after the first simple convolutional filtering,
and an average-pooling is used to feed MLP after the second simple convolutional filtering. For
both pooling layers, there is no overlap among adjacent pooling units. Hence, the stride values for
the pooling layers are always the same as the pooling kernel size.
For the max-pooling defined as equation (1), the pooling kernel size 5 × 5 with the stride
value 5.
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔(𝑥 ) = max 𝑖,𝑗 𝑥𝑖,𝑗

(1)

The average pooling that takes the pooling kernel size of 2 × 2 with the stride value 2, is
defined by the equation (2), where 𝑠 is the stride value.
1

𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔(𝑥 ) = 𝑠 ∑𝑠𝑖=1 𝑥𝑖

(2)

Each step's results from the simulated image and physical image are provided below. Preprocessing reduces the data dimensions from 500 x 500 x 1 to 50 x 50 x 1, while clearly extracting
outlines of features of the infill images. Each step of the pre-processing samples can be found in
Figure 14.
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Figure 14 Pre-processing Samples
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5.1.3.2 Multilayer Perceptron Neural Network

Figure 15 Multilayer Perceptron Neural Network
After creating final input values for training and testing layer images, a multilayer
perceptron (MLP) neural network is used to proceed with the input values. The neural network
consists of input nodes, hidden nodes, and output nodes. The number of the output nodes can be
decided based on the prepared image data set.
Propagation and back-propagation algorithms based on stochastic gradient descent are
implemented in the neural network process. Also, the sigmoid function is used for an activation
function in the network. For the propagation, equations (3) and (4) are used.
𝐻𝑚 = 𝑓(∑𝑛𝑘=1(𝐼𝑁𝑘 ∙ 𝑤𝑘+𝑛(𝑚−1)) + 𝑏𝑚 )

(3)

𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑙 = 𝑓(∑𝑚
𝑘=1(𝐻𝑘 ∙ 𝑤𝑘+𝑚(𝑙−1) ) + 𝑏𝑙 )

(4)
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For the back-propagation algorithm, equations (5) and (6) are used for updating each
weight (𝑤) and bias (𝑏). The learning rate (𝜂) is used to train the model was 0.1. Finally, a loss
function with logistic regression was used to validate the training process.
𝜕𝐸𝑙

+
𝑤𝑚(𝑛×𝑙)
= 𝑤𝑚(𝑛×𝑙) − 𝜂 ∙ 𝜕𝑤

(5)

𝑚(𝑛×𝑙)

𝜕𝐸𝑙

+
𝑏𝑚+𝑙
= 𝑏𝑚+𝑙 − 𝜂 ∙ 𝜕𝑏

(6)

𝑚+𝑙

5.1.3.3 Blockchain Implementation
To enable LIAS as an infill defective detection system in the additive manufacturing
industry from the viewpoint of ITTCPMS, LIAS's weights and biases can be available through the
system's network. In this way, training and testing layer images can be separated, so the
manufacturing operation process can avoid unnecessary delays, which include generating
simulated images and training these for LIAS. However, the weights and biases on the network
can easily be a target for attackers due to their sensitivity to the detection system and enlarged
attack surfaces. To prevent the weights and biases from unintended and malicious manipulations,
the blockchain can be integrated to securely store and transfer machine learning parameters. For
this reason, the algorithms for training and auditing of LIAS were developed by using Python 3
with the web3 package for blockchain communication. The algorithms used for testing LIAS are
shown in Figure 16 and Figure 17.
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Figure 16 Training Algorithm

Figure 17 Auditing Algorithm
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5.1.3.4 ITTCPMS Implementation

Figure 18 ITTCPMS with LIAS
Figure 18 shows the ITTCPMS when LIAS is applied. In the entity layer, the main physical
entity is a 3D printer, and SCADA is utilized to manage layer images from the printer. The
inspection result is also handled in SCADA.
The system operation starts from the manager's configuration. The simulated original and
defective layer images can be generated by the manager and trained by LIAS. This results in the
trained weights and biases, which are uploaded on the blockchain layer. When the data-to79

transaction conversion is executed by the service layer, the blockchain layer returns the transaction
hash, which is corresponding to the uploaded data, to the service layer. Then the service layer
delivers the transaction hash to the manager. This transaction hash is the key to access and run the
LIAS's auditing process. By accessing LIAS with the transaction hash and protecting the machine
learning parameters in the blockchain layer, the manager of the system can trust LIAS's result, but
also insiders can ensure the legitimacy of the inspection process.
5.1.4

Validation
To validate and evaluate LIAS, experiments were designed to provide a comparative

performance analysis of the classification. Since the main objective of LIAS's classification is to
detect defective infill layer images, a normal type of physical images was paired with each of the
defective types for testing. However, the experiments under the condition that various defective
types need continuously be developed over layers were not considered. Additive manufacturing
fabricates objects by continuously adding material layer by layer from bottom to top, hence early
defective detection in the low layer could enable to prevent other defectives in the higher layers.
To design the experiments, five different infill defective types were developed. The same
defective shape at different locations was used to differentiate defective types to evaluate LIAS in
an unbiased condition. Simulated images were created by CURA 4.1.0 SOFTWARE. A total of
12,000 simulated images were generated for the experiments, and the image data type and the
number are summarized in Table 5.
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Table 5 Simulated Layer Images

For the physical image data, MP Select Mini 3D printer V2 and Logitech C525 camera
were used. The camera was placed above the 3D printer to take a photo from the top view of the
printing sample layer by layer, and the photo was edited 500 pixels by 500 pixels. The summary
of physical image data is in Table 6.
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Table 6 Physical Layer Images

The experiment setups were as follows. First, pre-processing was conducted for all the
collected data using MATLAB. The MLP was constructed with 2,500 input nodes, 5 hidden nodes,
and 6 output nodes programmed by Python. Accordingly, a total of 12,530 weights and 11 biases
were initialized with random values. Also, the target value 0.99, and the non-target value 0.01 were
set to train six types of infill layers: normal, defective center, defective top-right, defective topleft, defective bottom-right, and defective bottom-left. 100 replications of training were set to make
sure the gradient descent process was completed. A desktop computer with i7-4790 CPU and Intel
graphic card was used to train the neural network. Total training time took around two hours, and
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updated weights and biases were uploaded to the blockchain by using web3 package of Python.
After uploading weights and biases, its transaction hash was returned, and it was entered to retrieve
the weight and biases for predictions.
Finally, five data sets—normal type physical images with each of defective types—were
tested by the LIAS. For the predictions, output nodes’ normal class and defective class scores were
analyzed. For the defective score, the highest score among 5 classes were chosen. Figure 19 shows
the five data sets’ final score results.

Figure 19 Final Score Results
Seen from Figure 19, LIAS effectively classified the normal class and defective classes.
Although the normal score itself hardly differentiates the classes, the defective score clearly shows
enough distinction between the normal class and the defective class. To acquire certain accuracy
values from the results, a Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve was exploited to find the
optimized threshold that maximizes True-Positive-Rate (TPR) for each result.
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A classification accuracy, False-Positive-Rate (FPR), and False-Negative-Rate (FNR)
were measured by equations (7), (8), and (9), where True-Positive is 𝑇𝑁, True-Negative is 𝑇𝑁,
False-Positive is 𝐹𝑃, and False-Negative is 𝐹𝑁.
𝑇𝑃+𝑇𝑁

𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 = 𝑇𝑃+𝑇𝑁+𝐹𝑃+𝐹𝑁

(7)

𝐹𝑃

𝐹𝑃𝑅 = 𝐹𝑃+𝑇𝑁

(8)

𝐹𝑁

𝐹𝑁𝑅 = 𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑁

(9)

Table 7 Prediction Results
Classification
Results
𝑇𝑃
70
Defective;
𝑇𝑁
69
Center
𝐹𝑃
1
𝐹𝑁
0
𝑇𝑃
45
Defective;
𝑇𝑁
46
Top-right
𝐹𝑃
5
𝐹𝑁
6
𝑇𝑃
47
44
Defective;
𝑇𝑁
Top-Left
3
𝐹𝑃
0
𝐹𝑁
48
𝑇𝑃
45
Defective;
𝑇𝑁
Bottom-Right 𝐹𝑃
3
0
𝐹𝑁
44
𝑇𝑃
46
Defective;
𝑇𝑁
Bottom-Left
1
𝐹𝑃
3
𝐹𝑁
254
𝑇𝑃
250
𝑇𝑁
Total
13
𝐹𝑃
9
𝐹𝑁
Condition

Accuracy

FPR

0.992857 0.014286

FNR

0.0

0.892157 0.098039 0.117647

0.968085 0.063830

0.0

0.968750 0.062500

0.0

0.957447 0.021277 0.063830

0.958175 0.049430 0.034221
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The results shown in Table 7 illustrate that the pre-processing is effective. Compared with
other labels, the Top-right defective shows the lowest accuracy with 89%. It turns out there was a
lighting issue that causes the low quality of the few images. However, the overall accuracy still
shows more than 90% for entire experiment conditions with a low level of FNR.
To evaluate how the blockchain affects the test response time, it was measured in two
different conditions: implementations with the blockchain and without the blockchain. The
blockchain provides a sufficient guarantee of security against attackers, but it also causes
redundant delays from the uncontrollable and arbitrary block generation time and block occurrence
frequency. This issue has been already resolved in LIAS by separating the auditing process from
the training process. Because the delays occur only for uploading the weights and biases to the
blockchain, not for retrieving the data from the blockchain. However, since the data have to be
passed through the blockchain, some delays still happen.
To objectively measure these delays, the response times for auditing physical images when
the weights and biases are locally retrieved (without blockchain) were recorded and compared with
the response time when the weights and biases are retrieved from the blockchain (with blockchain).
The average response time for implementation with the blockchain and without the blockchain
were 0.46285 and 0.15801 seconds, respectively. Although the result shows that the
implementation without the blockchain was faster than the implementation with the blockchain,
0.46285 second is still acceptable for real time inspection.
5.1.5

Discussion
The compromised parameters of machine learning algorithms can cause the detection

system to fail. In other words, the machine learning process itself is not safe from cyber-attacks. It
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can be corrupted by an attacker who tries to exploit the vulnerability of the system. For example,
an Adversarial Example Attack can pose serious threats to security-sensitive applications by
simply injecting small perturbations to correctly classified inputs (Lecuyer et al., 2019). Especially,
in the case of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs), only a small amount of malicious input data can
induce a flawed classification that can result in increased False Positive Rates (FPR) and False
Negative Rates (FNR).
To address such an issue, ITTCPMS employs the blockchain layer as a database for
machine learning parameters. The blockchain can provide better security than the general database
management system for the machine learning parameters since the old parameters remain in the
blockchain and are tightly linked to the new parameter to maintain data integrity. Therefore, it is
difficult to manipulate machine learning parameters without being discovered. All the processes
required for updating data, uploading data, or retrieving data will be recorded by the blockchain
layer, and these cannot be easily modified or removed.
However, adopting blockchain technology to the machine learning process is still in the
early stage. Since the size of data being stored in the blockchain is limited and can cause extra cost,
it is impossible to merely adopt the original blockchain concept for complicated and sophisticated
machine learning algorithms. To show and prove the concept of ITTCPMS with LIAS, the preprocessing—simplified filtering process—was forced for the machine learning algorithm. To
adopt blockchain technology for the wide range of machine learning applications, it is essential to
improve and optimize the blockchain itself.
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5.2
5.2.1

SPLC
Motivation
Insider threats are becoming more serious in the manufacturing industry as an automated

manufacturing system is being deployed and developed further. Particularly, when Industrial
Control Systems (ICS) for manufacturing process automation is employed, security vulnerabilities
by insiders increase. ICS—such as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems,
Distributed Control System (DCS), and Process Control Systems (PCS)—have been employed in
various industries to monitor and control data transmission in facilities. In general, ICS uses the
Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) as a control device, which is operating physical machines
based on Input/Output (I/O) data of a system. PLCs are typically located on the shop floor to form
a network environment. Furthermore, in CPMS, since they are integrated into the system via the
internet and computer networks, insiders have physical and digital access to the PLCs (Ghaleb et
al., 2018; Nicholson et al., 2012). As a result, insiders can intentionally or unintentionally pose
serious threats to the entire manufacturing process security through PLC.
To reduce the severity of insider threats, blockchain technology can be adopted for PLC
operation. However, attempts to utilize the blockchain to secure PLC have been few. Although
numerous researchers have explored the security of PLC communication, most of them have
focused on intruders from outside of the system.
As the first step to manage insider threats for PLC, a Secure Programmable Logic
Controller (SPLC) has been developed to validate input and output data for the manufacturing
process via blockchain technology. In order to validate SPLC in a practical manner and to assist
future research, a testbed was developed and is presented in this section.
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5.2.2

Background
PLC is a device to control physical machines in the shop floor. PLC controls the machines

based on input and output data and uses Boolean values. Typically, PLC requires an operating
system with the software for configuration. So it can be considered as a small computer that
collects data from sensors or user input, operates the physical machines, and returns its operation
result to the software or main operating system. The ladder logic is a graphical programming
language that enables PLC engineers to write, read, or modify the program code easily. The steps
for embedding the ladder logic code in PLC devices are: i) engineers write or modify code, ii) a
software compiles the ladder logic code to binary code for PLC devices, and iii) a software uploads
the code to the PLC device and embeds it to the system.
Since PLC is an important and dominant system component in the automation of
manufacturing systems, it is likely that the controller would still be considered as a control device
in CMS. However, PLC should meet new requirements and overcome security challenges to be
adopted to the systems. Langmann et al. (Langmann & Stiller, 2019) proposed a new type of a
PLC—Smart Industrial Control Services (SICS)—to fulfill the new conditions resulting from the
new operation processes. The PLC enables the separated control function to the related equipment
through a cloud server. SICS is powered by IEC6113
1-3 standard control program and can be run in two different modes: Server-Based Mixed
Mode and Server-Based Mode. There is another study about extracting sensing data from PLC for
CMS. The proposed method involves many approaches to identify useful data from the PLC
devices. Conclusively, multithreading and HashSet algorithms improved the data extraction
performance dramatically when these are applied to filter out the memory address (Leang et al.,
2019).
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Security vulnerabilities of PLC devices in Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) systems have been analyzed. The communication between PLC and engineering
station—which is in charge of configuration of the PLC—can be interfered or compromised by
the attackers in three attack methods: replay attack, man-in-the-middle-attack, and stealth
command modification attack (Ghaleb et al., 2018). There are two more attack methods—bypass
logic attack and brute-force output attack—oriented from legacy PLC protocols such as ModBus,
Ethernet/IP, DNP 317 and Iso-TSAP. To address such attacks, five solutions have been proposed:
protocol modification, protection via special filtering units, intrusion detection system, creation of
demilitarized zones, and practices for securing PLC systems (Sandaruwan et al., 2013).
PLC has been deployed for several decades without adopting any effective security
defensive mechanism. Even though various security policies, restrictions, and traditional IT
security such as firewalls have been adopted to prevent PLC program code from unauthorized
configuration; the validation process for input data has been minimal. In 2000, Maroochy Shire—
Queensland computerized waste management system—was hacked by a former employee. He had
installed the malicious program in the sewage control system and attacked the system after his job
application was rejected by the area's council. His laptop and a wireless radio were used to inject
unauthorized commands to the system to dump a large amount of sewage into the public area in
the city.
Also, PLC's high availability requirements can yield another security vulnerability. In 2010,
Iran's nuclear facilities identified the Stuxnet computer worm, which was specifically targeting the
Siemens control system and re-configuring PLC's programming-language-layer directly. Although
it is unknown how the facilities became infected, this could happen because of the po1tential
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threats that insiders can voluntarily or involuntarily reveal accessible routes into the system to
outsiders without being discovered (Langner, 2011).
5.2.3

Architecture

Figure 20 Physical Testbed Layout
The physical testbed was prepared to validate SPLC in a practical manner and to assist
future research. Figure 20 shows the layout of the testbed. The testbed is based on a virtual
manufacturing scenario to represent the general manufacturing practice. The additive
manufacturing supply chain was chosen for the basic model of the testbed, which comprises three
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main actors—Manufacturer, Supplier, and Deliverer—to provide 3D-printing services to
customers. To help understanding in the testbed layout, the photographs are provided in Figure 21.

Figure 21 Physical Testbed Photographs
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5.2.3.1 Actors
The manufacturer receives an order from the customer and sends its raw material order to
the supplier. The manufacturer represents the end manufacturer in the manufacturing industry. The
main task of the manufacturer is putting a design on a cube (1.5 x 1.5 x 1.5 inches), which can be
interpreted as a final manufacturing process, such as packaging, welding, assembly, and painting.
Three insiders were defined for the manufacturer in order to conduct insider threat analyses: order
manager, designer, and examiner.
The supplier who represents a raw material producer in the testbed receives the order from
the manufacturer and produces cubes from a 3D printer. Two attributes were defined for the cube.
But for the sake of simplicity, two attributes were distinguished by colors only. Two insiders were
defined for the supplier: 3D printing worker and order manager.
The deliverer stands for transportation between the manufacturer and the supplier; it
transfers the cube from the supplier to the manufacturer. In the testbed, the deliverer indicates the
geographical distance between the manufacturer and the supplier.
The manufacturer and the supplier can communicate through the internet network.
Particularly, since automated programmable logic controllers for the manufacturer and the supplier
are operated based on internet communication, the entire testbed operation can be controlled by
the testbed user interface remotely.
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Figure 22 Interactions among Actors
Figure 22 shows that the insiders of the manufacturer, the supplier, and the deliverer are
seemingly interacting with each other by sharing digital and physical assets. The order manager of
the manufacturer acquires digital assets—manufacturing specification, graphical designs, orders—
from its main webserver, creates the order based on the inventory status and sends it to the
supplier's order manager. And then, the 3D printing worker receives the order from the order
manager of the supplier and produces a cube. The cube is transferred from the supplier to the driver,
who delivers the cube to the manufacturer's order manager. The order manager of the manufacturer
passes the cube through the designer and the examiner in order. The designer operates a drawing
machine to apply the corresponding graphical designs, and the examiner performs a quality
inspection.
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5.2.3.2 Entities
The manufacturer consists of two robotic arms, two cube storages with ultrasonic sensors,
one CNC Drawing Machine, and one linear slide conveyor powered by Biopolar stepper motor.
These physical entities are controlled by six Arduino UNO boards, which are under the control of
Raspberry Pi 3.
The supplier consists of two robotic arms, one turntable operated by Bipolar stepper motor,
and two 3D-printers. One Raspberry Pi 3 with OpenPLC server and three Arduino UNO boards
are used to integrate physical entities of the supplier, except two 3D printers. In the case of the
deliverer, an automated guided vehicle (AGV) powered by the Arduino board is used. Additionally,
five avoidance sensors are used to guide the AGV and detect the cube on the AGV.

Figure 23 Physical Entity Connections
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In addition, another Raspberry Pi 3 is used to maintain the manufacturer's webserver to
enable communication between the customers and the manufacturers and store all the original
digital assets. Four DC power supplies are used to power the stepper motors and servo motors
comprising robotic arms. Lastly, the entire testbed's frame consists of 20 × 20 𝑚𝑚 T-slotted
aluminum bars with joiners, nuts, and bolts. A layout of the components and connections can be
found in Figure 23.

Figure 24 Front-End Structure
The manufacturer's webserver, the manufacturer's PLC server, and the supplier's PLC
server are remotely connected via the UDP/IP protocol. The communication is done by
sending/receiving packets, which are created by the C-programming language with the raw socket
library. Each PLC server and physical entities' controller are connected by 24 gauge silicone wires.
Customers can access the webserver with the user interface front-end through HTTP protocol.
Details of the front-end structure can be found in Figure 24.
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The user interface front-end was built by PHP 5.0, JavaScript, and MySQL database. The
webserver's access authentication is managed by ID & password login system with the database,
and it limits the access to the certain PHP documents based on the authentication. Data
transmission between PHP documents are done by POST & GET method, and basic security
method such as cookie and special character filtering were applied. Each php documents interacts
with the MySQL database. The structure of the database can be found below.

Figure 25 Database Structure
Open-sourced Programmable Logic Controller (OpenPLC) with IEC 61131-3 standard was
installed to integrate all the physical entities. Two different ladder logics were written for the
manufacturer and the supplier, and those were embedded in the manufacturer's PLC server and the
supplier's PLC server.
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The entire flow chart of testbed operating simulation is presented in Figure 27. The
manufacturer PLC server and the supplier PLC server are running the OpenPLC server at 8080
port to manage each other's physical entities and Python SCAPY script at 9090 port to receive
packets that are generated by C-programing. The number of simulation replications is assigned as
present number of orders (PO), and the simulation will be terminated after PO reaches 0.
This logic starts from the webserver. Sending an order to Manufacturer PLC server and
check the inventory status. After that, if there is no stock in the Manufacturer’s inventory, the order
is generated and send to supplier. Similarly, if there is no raw material in the supplier’s inventory,
3D printing worker produce the material, and then processed. Once Manufacturer’s inventory is
filled, Manufacturer’s PLC server proceeds the product by following the programmed ladder logic.
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PO
Present number of Order
ILI
Initial Level of Inventory
SI, MI
Supplier Inventory, Manufacturer Inventory
NRO
Number of Requested Order
MWS
Manufacturer Main Web Server
MPLC, SPLC Manufacturer PLC Server, Supplier PLC server
R1, R2, R3, R4
Robot arm 1, 2, 3, 4
TT
Turn Table
AGV
Automated Guided Vehicle
C
Conveyor
CVM, DM
Cube Vise Machine, Drawing Machine
->
Trigger a signal (e.g. A -> B = A trigger B to operate)
Figure 26 Nomenclature for the Flowchart

Figure 27 Testbed Operation Flowchart
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5.2.3.3 Blockchain Implementation
To implement the blockchain layer into SPLC, three programs are run in the PLC devices
simultaneously: OpenPLC software, Python, and GETH client. OpenPLC and Python's GPIO
package with WiringPi are interacting by I/O data. Uploaded input data in the blockchain layer is
transferred by Python's web3 package through GETH client to be utilized for PLC operations. Also,
a new I/O data can be uploaded in the same way. The algorithms for retrieving data and uploading
data can be found in Figure 28 and Figure 29, respectively.

Figure 28 Retrieving Data
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Figure 29 Uploading Data
As a result, PLC can have a two-way communication channel with the blockchain by
employing Python as an intermediary. The channel's algorithms and architecture are presented as
follows.

Figure 30 Communication Channel for SPLC
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In this way, input data for PLC operations only can be accessed by entering a transaction
hash that is returned when the input data is uploaded. Also, the input data is retrieved and
temporarily existed in the memory of the PLC device when the valid transaction hash is entered,
while the input data is permanently and immutably stored in the blockchain. Hence, insiders only
can operate the PLC device based on pre-uploaded input data and cannot modify the data without
attacking the blockchain. This means that PLC can now have a strong validation process for the
input data.
5.2.3.4 ITTCPMS Implementation

Figure 31 ITTCPMS with SPLC
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Figure 31 shows how SPLC can be applied to ITTCPMS. SPLC devices with the multiple
physical entities are placed in the entity layer. The SPLC server is in the service layer,
communicating with SPLC and managing the ladder logic.
From the manager's configuration process, the verified Input and Output data will be
organized and uploaded on the blockchain layer via the service layer. As explained for the LIAS
operation process, the generated transaction hash will be delivered to the insiders and used to
access the uploaded data.
5.2.4

Discussion
Insiders can make modifications that can result in serious damage to the physical machines

in the system. For example, insiders can change the sensitive manufacturing specifications by
modifying input values such as heating treatment temperature, nozzle travels the speed of 3Dprinter, and a spindle speed of CNC machines (Wu & Moon, 2018). In the PLC testbed, it is
assumed that the largest shareholder—a manufacturer in the manufacturer's factory—of the system
is holding a ground truth while potential insiders could be PLC engineers, shop floor workers, or
production managers (Song, Shukla, et al., 2020).
However, the blockchain can effectively prevent the data from insiders' malicious
modification. The blockchain can reduce the insider threats risk by adding a validation process for
input data. PLC can only proceed with legitimate input data by entering the transaction hash to
retrieve corresponding data, which is already validated by the blockchain. Now, insiders need to
find out the exact transaction hash value of false order and alter the embedded legitimate
transaction hash to false order's transaction hash to attack the system, which is only available for
the limited number of insiders. Also, since input data's transaction hash will be renewed every time
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when the main control server is sending the input data, it is not easy to identify the legitimate input
data from the transaction hash. In another way, insiders can add new input data to the blockchain
and acquire a malicious transaction hash. But insiders need to access the private blockchain, which
allows only a limited number of insiders to join. Lastly, modifying the blockchain itself can be
another way to directly modify input data. To do this, insiders require computing power more than
50% of the power of entire blockchain node machines or need to compromise and manipulate more
than half number of entire the node machines' blockchain repository. However, such an attempt is
not practical, so it is fruitless (Afanasev et al., 2018).
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Chapter 6. Insider Attack Tree

In this chapter, insider threats in Cyber-Physical Manufacturing System (CPMS) are
examined in depth. In order to better understand different ways in which a system can be attacked
by insiders, Insider Attack Tree (IAT) is presented. The IAT consists of four parts: Root, Branch,
Sub-Branch, and Leaf. The Root is the eventual attack target for insiders, and the Branches
represent three different assets in CPMS. Sub-branches indicate the attack targets of assets while
the Leaf represents attack vectors.
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6.1

Insider Threats
Advances in automation and network technologies have enabled the manufacturing

industry to take a step forward towards the realization of the vision of Cyber-Manufacturing
Physical System (CPMS). The manufacturing industry can take advantage of CPMS to increase
productivity, enhance quality, and reduce manufacturing costs (Hutchins et al., 2015).
However, CPMS ushers in unseen security challenges from the sheer volume and
pervasiveness of exchanged data along with the enlarged attack surface for both outside and inside
attackers. Particularly, insiders who have been or are affiliated with a system can pose more sever
threats than outsiders, and their threats are especially enlarged in CPMS. For example, CPMS's
cross-domain structure's physical domain and the digital domain will enlarge insider attack
consequences because insiders in the system will have more extended control and access to the
system properties (Song & Moon, 2020b). Also, they can easily hide their digital footprint because
they have legitimate access authentications to manipulate or remove their digital records, such as
event logs, browsing history, and any surveillance history data. Moreover, insiders can
unintentionally become a bridge to the system for outsiders by social engineering attacks, such as
phishing, scam, and misconfiguration (Greitzer et al., 2011; Salahdine & Kaabouch, 2019).
Besides, since the growth of collaborative business in the manufacturing industry blurs the
boundary between insiders and outsiders, it is hard to decide who insiders are in the system
(Schultz, 2002). Finally, there is a critical contradictory problem between security and flexibility.
Merely increasing restrictions on the system will definitely improve system security. However, it
also reduces system flexibility (Sinclair & Smith, 2008).
Accordingly, concerns about security in manufacturing systems have been reported by
many security organizations. In 2017 CERT and 2018 IBM reports, manufacturing is found to be
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the second most industry that experienced cyber-attacks (IBM, 2018). Among those attacks, 23
percent of cyber-attacks were suspected to be caused by insiders. 45 percent of survey respondents
agreed that the damage from insider attacks was more critical than the damage from outsider
attacks (CERT, 2019). However, while some research about insider threats has been performed in
the information system community, such research in CPMS has not been conducted or at least not
reported.
The consequences of insider attacks can affect the dramatic physical domain in CPMS.
Insiders may end up with serious damages in CPMS not only through information leakage or
intellectual property theft, but also by damaging facilities, sabotaging manufacturing operations,
and perpetrating acts of security policy violation. The attacks that begin in digital format may
result in malfunctioning manufacturing equipment, defective products, or any other unintended
changes (Wu & Moon, 2018). Insiders can exacerbate or provoke Cyber-Physical Attacks in a
shifty way. Insiders who are knowledgeable of the system can easily bypass or incapacitate the
security process and compromise the system to induce physical damage. The growth of
outsourcing and subcontracting in the manufacturing industry can also increase the number of
insider attacks in a supply chain and contribute to diversifying the attack methods.
Despite the severity of insider threats in CPMS, in the manufacturing community,
understanding of its significance is limited. According to the Intelligence and National Security
Alliance (INSA), only 8% of survey respondents in 2018 are acquiring internal identity data to
warn of an impending attack. Respondents also answered that it is difficult to develop skilled labor
and adequate defensive preparation due to the lack of known threats to their organizations. Without
being aware of potential threats, they often make inappropriate decisions that can yield wasteful
expenditures (INSA, 2018a, 2018b).
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6.2

Insider Attack Tree
As the first step to systematically understand different ways insiders can compromise

CPMS, an Attack Tree can be utilized. Attack Tree systematically classifies different ways in
which a system can be attacked (Audinot et al., 2018). The Attack Tree’s nodes consist of the root
node, children of a node, and leaves. Each node represents the main goal of an attacker, refinements
of the goal, attacks that cannot be refined, and those that can be used to analyze attributes of the
system security (Mauw & Oostdijk, 2006). The Attack Tree can be used to investigate system
security in various ways. Saini et al. (Saini et al., 2008) use the Attack Tree to develop the concept
of threat modeling, which provides practical and high-level guidance. Also, to design the attacker's
behavior, the Attack Tree can be extended by adopting the temporal order of the attacker's
decision-making process (Jürgenson & Willemson, 2010). Moreover, a particularly refined form
of the Attack Tree has been employed to develop a simple risk-analysis-based method (Buldas et
al., 2006). However, insider threats have never been analyzed by using the Attack Tree.
In order to better understand different ways in which a system can be attacked by insiders,
Insider Attack Tree (IAT) is developed and presented. The IAT consists of four components: Root,
Branch, Sub-Branch, and Leaf. The Root represents an ultimate attack target while the Branch
indicates domains of CPMS's asset: physical asset, digital asset, and access authorization. The SubBranch is the attack target for each Branch, whereas the Leaf refers to a specific attack vector to
compromise its Sub-Branch.
In the Branch, access authorization can be viewed as digital asset. However, access
authorization is different from digital asset in many respects. Access authorization is a part of the
system to manage access to CPMS's assets. On the other hand, digital assets such as manufacturing
information, product specification, supply chain management, and design are highly related to the
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manufacturing process and can affect the process in various ways. Also, access authorization is
subject to be an attack target to access CPMS’s asset, but digital asset is attacked to compromise
the manufacturing process itself. Therefore, attack scenarios and the scope of insiders for access
authorization should be separated from digital assets.
The main objectives of the IAT are: i) to analyze insider threats across cyber and physical
domains in CPMS; ii) to identify possible insider attack scenarios; iii) to diagnose system
vulnerabilities against insiders, and iv) to help design technical countermeasures.
The Insider Attack Tree can be found in Figure 32.
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Figure 32 Insider Attack Tree
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6.2.1

Physical Asset
Physical asset in CPMS can be categorized into Equipment, Product, and Manufacturing

Environment. Insiders working in a shop floor or having access authorization can intentionally or
unintentionally imperil the physical asset with eight possibilities.

Figure 33 Physical Asset
6.2.1.1 Compromising Equipment
Manipulating Sensor: Sensors attached to machineries such as temperature, motion, or
acoustic sensors can be manipulated by insiders. Insiders can directly inflict physical damages on
sensors or alter operation codes to corrupt data integrity. Sensor manipulation can result in
malfunctions in manufacturing processes and cause production accidents (Wu & Moon, 2019).
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Manipulating Actuator: Actuators including hydraulic, pneumatic, and electric types are
susceptible to insider manipulation. Even unintended subtle changes can immediately cause a
failure of a machine and destruction of the entire system.
Manipulating Controller: Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) that is commonly used in
the manufacturing industry can be compromised by insiders. PLC manipulation can cause an
unintended series of machine operations and induce production accidents.
Manipulating Manufacturing Software: A software that operates manufacturing equipment
such as a 3D-printer or robotic arm can be altered by insiders. For example, a CNC milling machine
software can be changed to increase the spindle speed, which may result in over-wearing of the
end mill tool (Wu & Moon, 2019).
6.2.1.2 Compromising Product
Altering System Code: System codes embedded in the product can be modified by insiders.
Insiders knowledgeable of product specification can alter the code that would pass Quality Control
(QC) but eventually fail when the product is operated by end-users (Sturm et al., 2017). It can also
result in malfunction or a reduced lifecycle of a product.
Injecting Backdoor: A backdoor is an intended malicious code structure within a system
that provides unauthorized access to the privileged functionality of the system. Insiders can inject
the backdoor into the product's software or hardware, which allows outside attackers to access the
product's administrative control (Thomas & Francillon, 2018).
6.2.1.3 Compromising Manufacturing Environment
Chemical Release: Insiders can voluntarily or involuntarily release chemical substances
such as oil, ammonia, chlorine, etc. According to the United States Chemical Safety and Hazard
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Investigation Board (CSB), the chemical release was the most frequent incident during 2005–2006
(Gomez et al., 2008).
Manipulating Emission Treatment Process: The emission treatment process can be
manipulated by insiders. The malfunctioned emission treatment process may yield a serious
worker health hazard. For example, high concentrations of nanoparticles have been observed from
industrial-scale 3D-printer operations without proper ventilation in the facility (Davis et al., 2019).
6.2.2

Digital Asset
Digital assets can be jeopardized by compromising manufacturing specifications, design

integrity, and supply chain communication. Insiders who are in the security parameter of a system
can intentionally or unintentionally attack the Digital Asset with eight possibilities.

Figure 34 Digital Asset
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6.2.2.1 Compromising Manufacturing Specification
Injecting Malicious Item: Malicious Item can be injected by insiders bypassing the
inspection process. For instance, a 3D-model design that involves infill defectives can be injected,
which does not affect the exterior (Wu et al., 2017).
Manipulating Operation Schedule: The operation schedule is one of the important assets
in digital form, and it can be manipulated by insiders, especially involuntary insiders. For example,
an insider might mismatch operation schedules due to a miscommunication.
Manipulating Inspection Process: Inspection processes in the manufacturing system
cannot be free from the attack by insiders. Insiders can manipulate inspection parameters such as
threshold or inspection programming code to compromise inspection processes (Song & Moon,
2020c).
6.2.2.2 Compromising Design Integrity
Modifying Structure Property: The structure of the design can be manipulated by insiders
to compromise the physical specifications of the product such as tension or strain, as well as design
features.
Modifying Dimension Property: Insiders can change the dimension property of the design,
which can yield improper assembly processes. This attack can be accomplished stealthily. For
instance, if the insider scales the design slightly while keeping the design’s overall shape, it would
be hard to detect the changes and can cause a product quality issue.
Manipulating Raw Material: The raw material can be changed by insiders. This attack may
occur in a business-to-business relationship. For example, a supplier would replace the raw
material for the part if it is cheaper but can pass the quality control required by a manufacturer.
However, it can result in various side effects after some time.
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6.2.2.3 Compromising Supply Chain Communication
Manipulating Order Request: Insiders can manipulate order requests between
manufacturers and suppliers to compromise inventory control or manufacturing processes. Insiders
can manipulate the communication with Man-In-The-Middle-Attack (MITMA), which exploits
internet network vulnerabilities.
Manipulating Supplier Matching: The supplier for a manufacturer is determined by various
factors such as availability, production capacity and quality, cost, and distance. So it can also be
manipulated by insiders. The compromised factors may increase the manufacturing expenses and
decrease the product quality.
6.2.3

Access Authorization
Access authorization requires a high level of confidentiality since it controls access to

CPMS's assets. At the same time, access authorization is subject to an attack target by not only
insiders but also outsiders. Access authorization can be attacked by compromising the system
database, internal communication, and external communication.
Access authorization can be viewed as the digital asset. However, access authorization is
different from the digital asset in many respects. Access authorization is a part of the system to
manage access to CPMS's assets. On the other hand, digital assets such as manufacturing
information, product specification, supply chain management, and design are highly related to the
manufacturing process and can affect the process in various ways. Also, access authorization is
subject to be an attack target to access CPMS’s asset, but the digital asset is attacked to compromise
the manufacturing process itself. Therefore, attack scenarios and the scope of insiders for access
authorization should be separated from digital assets.
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Figure 35 Access Authorization
6.2.3.1 Compromising System Database
Manipulating Access Data Integrity: Insiders can directly manipulate access data by using
their authorizations. Also, breaching their access authorization data may cause impersonating
attacks by outsiders: an attacker who acquires a legitimate insider's access authorization
impersonates another user for malicious purposes (Salem et al., 2008).
6.2.3.2 Compromising Internal Communication
Eavesdropping: Insiders may become careless in managing their access authorization,
which can violate the security policies of the system. It can also be eavesdropped on or picked up
by voluntary insiders to be used for malicious purposes.
Sniffing and Spoofing: Insiders who are knowledgeable of the IT network structure of the
system can use sniffing and spoofing code to steal or breach access authorization. Since the insiders
are in the same network environment, it is easy to use the internet network vulnerabilities to
succeed in the attack such as DNS server attacks.
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6.2.3.3 Compromising External Communication
Social Engineering Attack: Social Engineering Attacks—such as phishing, SMSishing,
baiting, fake software—are deceiving individuals or enterprises to accomplish certain actions that
benefit attackers (Salahdine & Kaabouch, 2019). Social engineering attack is one of the critical
insider threats because it reveals accessible routes into the system to outsiders, although
involuntarily sometimes. Generally, social engineering attack utilizes mediums that are used for
external communication such as phone, email, webpage, etc. For example, Target, the eighthlargest retailer in the United States, was attacked with a credit card data breach by a third-party
vendor, which resulted in 7.5 million dollars worth of customers’ credit card information leaking
in 2013 (Harris, 2016).
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Chapter 7. Assessment and Case Studies

To validate and evaluate the insider threat tolerant Cyber-Physical Manufacturing System
(CPMS) augmented by the service-oriented blockchain, this chapter presents an Insider Attack
Scenario Assessment Framework (IASAF) to evaluate vulnerabilities of manufacturing systems
against insiders. The framework investigates pitfalls from insiders by evaluating potential insider
attack scenarios within five domains: Actor, Preparation, Implementation, Consequence, and
Recovery. The proposed framework is used to evaluate four attack scenarios generated using the
Insider Attack Tree: Manipulating Inspection Process, Sniffing and Spoofing, Injecting Malicious
Item, and Social Engineering. Each attack scenario is explained and developed as a case study. To
demonstrate the effectiveness of the blockchain, two simulation models (LIAS and SPLC) without
the blockchain layer were used for the case studies.
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7.1

Insider Attack Scenario Assessment Framework

Figure 36 Insider Attack Scenario Assessment Framework
As the growth of fully automated manufacturing systems and the complexity of these
systems has been developed, a diverse and complicated problem arises concerning conditions
associated with system compositions, operating configurations, and behaviors. As a result, an
assessment framework of existing methods barely affords necessary information about the various
conditions of problems in manufacturing systems (Primova et al., 2018). Besides, it is not adequate
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to assess a system to analyze attacks from insiders—who are in a security perimeter of a system—
because they are parts of the system and can elude and deceive the assessment process.
To address such issues, a new approach to assess systems from the viewpoint of attack
methodology has been developed: An Insider Attack Scenario Assessment Framework (IASAF).
IASAF can help to analyze system vulnerabilities by assessing attacks. IASAF examines an attack
by five domains in order: Actor, Preparation, Implementation, Consequence, and Recovery. Each
domain consists of a set of questions that evaluates the attack in terms of two key factors of the
domain. The domains, key factors, and its indicator are organized in Table 8.
Table 8 Key Factor and Indicator
Domain

Key Factor

Indicator

Motivations

A1

Numbers

A2

Access

P1

Targets

P2

Surreptitiousness

I1

Duration

I2

Damage Scope

C1

Detection Time

C2

Restoration

R1

Prevention

R2

Actor

Preparation

Implementation

Consequence

Recovery
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7.1.1

Actor
In Actor domain, the quantitative evaluation will be processed by assessing attack

motivations and the number of insiders. Motivation is one of the most difficult factors of IASAF,
because it is elusive to predict insider attacks in advance, due to the varied human motivations and
limited understanding of human psychology with regard to this subject (Moore, 2016). However,
by categorizing the attack's intention and the degree of its intensity, the motivation can be
objectively evaluated.
7.1.2

Preparation
This domain will check the requirements of the attack implementation based on two key

factors: Access and Targets. It is essential to identify required entities to successfully implement
the attack, such as sensors, controllers, and servers. For the evaluation, i) security clearance level,
ii) position, and iii) policies to access the entities can be considered as well as the number of the
entities. The target is defined as the attack target, which is necessary to be compromised or
manipulated for the attack implementation. Since physical and digital entities of a system are
varied by different manufacturing systems, a customized checklist for the domain is inevitable.
7.1.3

Implementation
The attack timeline for this domain is before the damage has occurred. Surreptitiousness

and duration of the attacks will be measured and evaluated. Accessing and compromising system
entities must leave digital traces, such as event logs, browsing history, and any surveillance history
data. However, insiders can easily hide their digital footprint because they have legitimate access
authentications to manipulate or remove their digital records. Therefore, these records that need to
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be erased are considered for the surreptitiousness. Also, the duration to execute the attack—
including a preparation phase—is checked.
7.1.4

Consequence
For Consequence, the attack timeline is after the damage has occurred. The attack

consequences will be checked in terms of the scope of the damage and detection time. For the
scope of the damage, a significance of the entities based on hierarchical system structure will be
considered alone with the number of the entities. The detection time can be measured based on the
systems operation process.
7.1.5

Recovery
Finally, in the recovery, the level of the required restoration process and attack prevention

will be evaluated. The length of the restoration process is the main measurement of this domain.
Also, potential technical countermeasures for the attack and its cost and efficacy are also
considered.
7.2

Case Study Design
This section presents case studies with IASAF implementation. The attack scenarios from

the Insider Attack Tree (IAT) were chosen for the case studies, and three different attack methods
are used to simulate the scenarios. For the attack scenario selection, since LIAS and SPLC have
different manufacturing objectives and purposes with the service layer, Manipulating Inspection
Process and Social Engineering were chosen for LIAS, and SPLC was tested with two other attack
scenarios: Injecting Malicious Item and Sniffing and Spoofing. These are organized in the
following Table 9.
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Table 9 Attack Scenario and Target Model

7.2.1

Case

Attack Scenario

Target Model

Case Study 1

Manipulating Inspection Process

LIAS

Case Study 2

Social Engineering

LIAS

Case Study 3

Injecting Malicious Item

SPLC

Case Study 4

Sniffing and Spoofing

SPLC

Testbeds for the case studies
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the blockchain implementation, the attack scenarios

should be simulated under the condition without the blockchain layer. Therefore, for the testbeds
of the case studies, the blockchain layer was removed from LIAS and SPLC while remaining their
functionalities. The testbeds consist of three layers: user Layer, entity Layer, and service Layer.
The architecture of the testbeds for LIAS and SPLC can be found in Figure 37 and Figure 38,
respectively.
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Figure 37 Testbed for LIAS

Figure 38 Testbed for SPLC
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7.2.2

Questionnaires for IASAF
To evaluate attack scenarios from the case studies, questionnaires for five domains of

IASAF were created. The evaluation is made for each key factor of the domain, and the key factors
are evaluated by three levels of the degree of posing threat risks: moderate (*), significant (**),
and critical (***).
For Actor domain, the questionnaire for the motivation and numbers are created. Two
major motivations of insiders (Voluntary and Involuntary) were used to comprise the questionnaire
for the motivation. For the numbers, two categories of the insiders (Skilled and Layperson) were
also included in the questionnaire to consider the quality as well as the quantity of the insiders.
The questionnaires for Actor domain in Table 10.
Table 10 Actor Questionnaire
Key Factor

Motivations

Numbers

Indicator

A1

A2

Degree

Questionnaire

Moderate
(*)

Can either voluntary or involuntary insiders be
motivated to the scenario?

Significant
(**)

Can both voluntary and involuntary insiders be
motivated to the scenario?

Critical
(***)

Is it hard to determine the motivation of the
scenario?

Moderate
(*)

Are more than two insiders, who are layperson or
skilled or on a high position, involved?

Significant
(**)

Is only one insider, who is skilled or on a high
position, involved in the scenario?

Critical
(***)

Is only one insider, who is a layperson, involved
in the scenario?
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Preparation domain has two key factors: Access and Targets. The access was evaluated
whether the insiders have the access authority to the entities for the attack scenario. For the target,
the access to the digital entities and physical entities are separated. Also, the questionnaire for the
target considers the number of the targets, because some attack scenarios may require attacking
more than two targets to successfully compromise the system. The questionnaires for Preparation
domain in Table 11.
Table 11 Preparation Questionnaire
Key Factor

Access

Targets

Indicator

P1

P2

Degree

Questionnaire

Moderate
(*)

Do insiders have no access authority to the
entities required for the attack scenario?

Significant
(**)

Do insiders have partial access authority to the
entities required for the attack scenario?

Critical
(***)

Do insiders have access authority to all the
entities required for the attack scenario?

Moderate
(*)

Are more than two digital or physical entities
required to be accessed to implement the attack?

Significant
(**)

Are both the digital and physical entities required
to be accessed to implement the attack?

Critical
(***)

Is either a single digital or physical entity
required to be accessed to implement the attack?

For Implementation domain, the questionnaires for the surreptitiousness and duration key
factors are created. Mainly, a digital footprint and surveillance record were used to evaluate the
surreptitiousness. For the duration, to objectively evaluate the attack duration, a TAKT time was
introduced. The TAKT time is a manufacturing terminology to describe the required production
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timeline, which can satisfy the demand (Moorthi et al., 2011). The questionnaires for
Implementation domain in Table 12.
Table 12 Implementation Questionnaire
Key Factor

Surreptitiousness

Duration

Indicator

I1

I2

Degree

Questionnaire

Moderate
(*)

Does the attack leave a digital footprint or any
surveillance record, but insiders cannot delete it?

Significant
(**)

Does the attack leave a digital footprint or any
surveillance record, but insiders can delete it?

Critical
(***)

Does the attack leave no digital footprint or any
surveillance record?

Moderate
(*)

Can the attack only be implemented with a long
time period?

Significant
(**)

Can the attack be shortly implemented within a
takt time?

Critical
(***)

Can the attack be instantly implemented without
any delay?

There are two key factors in Consequence domain: the damage scope and detection time.
The scope of the damage is highly dependent on the systems and services. Therefore, entities'
functionality and performances were focused on for the questionnaire. The takt time is used again
for the detection time to objectively assess the key factor. The questionnaires for Consequence
domain in Table 13.

126

Table 13 Consequence Questionnaire
Key Factor

Indicator

Damage Scope

Detection Time

C1

C2

Degree

Questionnaire

Moderate
(*)

Is the attack damage not affecting other entities'
functionality or performances at all?

Significant
(**)

Can the attack affect other entities' functionality
or performances?

Critical
(***)

Is the attack damage transferable to other entities
that are not targeted in the attack scenario?

Moderate
(*)

Will the attack consequences be detected
instantly after damaging the system?

Significant Will the attack consequences be detected within a
(**)
takt time?
Critical
(***)

Is the attack detection time unpredictable and
taking a long time period?

Finally, Recovery domain is evaluated by two key factors, the restoration and prevention.
The degree of the restoration is decided based on whether the system is operational after the
restoration process. For the prevention, limiting insiders' authority or manufacturing process was
mainly focused. These solutions can absolutely prevent the insider attacks but it also decreases the
manufacturing productivity, capacity, and efficiency. Therefore, the attack can pose moderate
threats to the system if the attack can be prevented by merely changing existing security policy or
system configuration.
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Table 14 Recovery Questionnaire.
Key Factor

Restoration

Prevention

7.2.3

Indicator

R1

R2

Degree

Questionnaire

Moderate
(*)

Can the system be restored and operated after
detecting the attack?

Significant
(**)

Can the system be restored and operated within a
takt time after detecting the attack?

Critical
(***)

Is the system permanently damaged, and it cannot
be restored and operated within a takt time?

Moderate
(*)

Can the attack be prevented by changing the
existing security policy or system configuration?

Significant
(**)

Can the attack be prevented without limiting
insiders' authority or manufacturing process?

Critical
(***)

Can the attack only be prevented by limiting
insiders' authority or manufacturing process?

Case Study 1: Manipulating Inspection Process
An inspection process is one of the important manufacturing processes to maintain the

quality of the production and detect malicious behavior of the system. To follow a vision of the
future manufacturing systems, the inspection process can be also integrated into the autonomous
manufacturing process. As a result, insiders can easily access to the process and control the
parameters with their legitimate access authentication. Thus, it cannot be free from the attack by
insiders, and its risk is enlarged due to the connectivity and availability of the system.
Case study 1 describes how insiders can manipulate the inspection process in CPMS
environments. The attack target for the case study is LIAS. Insider will manually modify the
parameter of the neural network to manipulate the results of the layer image inspection. One of the
weights trained by the manager of LIAS was changed to demonstrate the attack, and its results are
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presented and explained. The attack was analyzed by using IASAF, and it is compared with the
system with the blockchain layer to explain how blockchain technology can prevent this attack
from insiders.
7.2.3.1 Attack Description

Figure 39 Direct Modification
The major difference between insiders and outsiders is that only insiders can access a
system. The attack method "Direct Modification" can only be implemented by insiders, especially,
who have legitimate access authentication to the system. Therefore, this attack method does not
require any special techniques or skills to compromise system entities. Furthermore, Direct
Modification is not limited to intentional insider threats. According to IBM's annual security report,
the number of security incidents in the operational technology industry has been dramatically
increased, and the major reason for this significant rise was misconfigurations by insiders. The
number of incidents from the misconfiguration made up 86 percent of the records reported in 2019
(IBM, 2020b).
LIAS utilizes a Multilayer Perceptron Neural Network (MLP) to train the pattern of the
normal and defective layer images. The back-propagation algorithm enables MLP to find
optimized weight (𝑤) and bias (𝑏), which are used to calculate the similarity of the images.
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Therefore, compromising just one of the weights and biases can cause spurious results. Besides,
the results can be fabricated by compromising a certain weight or bias to deceive the manager
(Seibold et al., 2020). By changing certain area's weights or biases, all the true positive (TP) can
be classified as negative, thus it will result in a false negative (FN). Similarly, all the true negative
(TN) can be classified as positive, which results in a false positive (FP). Moreover, by changing
random weights and biases, the result can be stochastically compromised. Four attack forms—
False-Positive Attack, False-Negative Attack, False-Inverse Attack, and False-Random attack—
are defined and tested with a total of 107 samples, the results can be found in Table 15.
Table 15 Manipulated Inspection Result
TP

TN

FP

FN

Original

72

35

0

0

False-Positive Attack

72

0

35*

0

False-Negative Attack

0

35

0

72*

False-Inverse Attack

0

0

35*

72*

False-Random Attack

34

17

18*

28*

*compromised result
Seen from above table, insiders can manipulate inspection results in a variety of forms.
Especially, False-Random Attack is a critical attack form because it can be activated after a longterm period without being discovered, but eventually causing a considerable amount of extra
manufacturing expenses.
7.2.3.2 Attack Simulation
To simulate the attack, a total of 140 samples (Normal: 70, Defective-Center: 70) was
chosen from the validation experiments of LIAS in chapter 5. The target digital entity in this
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simulation is the uploaded weights and biases, which are trained by 12,000 simulated images.
Originally, LIAS stores such machine learning parameters in the blockchain layer, but the testbed
used in this attack simulation stores the digital entity in the local database. Therefore, it is assumed
that insiders can easily access the parameter and compromise it. To test the samples with the
compromised parameters, just one value from the trained weights was manually changed to a
random value and tested. The result is shown in Table 16.
Table 16 Attack Result
Condition

Defective; Center
with legitimate weight and bias

Defective; Center
with compromised weight and bias

Classification
Results
𝑇𝑃

70

𝑇𝑁

69

𝐹𝑃

1

𝐹𝑁

0

𝑇𝑃

46

𝑇𝑁

39

𝐹𝑃

27

𝐹𝑁

28

Accuracy

FPR

FNR

0.992857

0.014286

0.0

0.607143

0.409091 0.378378

Seen from the result, only one weight out of 125,530 weights was compromised but the
classification result was largely affected. The accuracy was dropped from 99% to 61%, and FPR
was increased by 41% as well as FNR.
7.2.3.3 IASAF Analysis
Based on the attack description and attack simulation of the case study, IASAF analysis
was conducted by answering the questionnaires for IASAF. The analysis results are provided by a
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table with each factor's risk degree and a radar chart with the summation of the number of the star
(*) within the same domain. The results are presented in Table 17.
Table 17 IASAF Result for Case Study 1
Domain

Key Factor

Indicator Risk Degree

Motivations

A1

**

Numbers

A2

**

Access

P1

***

Targets

P2

***

Surreptitiousness

I1

*

Duration

I2

**

Damage Scope

C1

*

Detection Time

C2

***

Restoration

R1

**

Prevention

R2

***

Actor

Preparation

Implementation

Consequence

Recovery
Moderate (*), Significant (**), Critical (***)
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Figure 40 Radar Chart Analysis for Case Study 1
Since it is assumed that the insider has the access authority to the specific digital entity,
trained weights and biases, the number of potential insiders is limited. Also, the motivation of the
attack was quite clear, the posed threat risks from Actor domain were comparably low. Meanwhile,
Preparation domain shows the highest threat risks, because the attack scenario has only one target,
the machine learning parameter, and the insider's access and manipulation were legitimate. For
this reason, this attack scenario has moderate surreptitiousness. However, since the inspection
results can be controlled randomly by the False-Random Attack, which makes the attack is hardly
detected for a long time period. For Consequence domain, the damage scope was only limited to
the single digital entity, and the detection time can be unpredictable. Finally, since there is no way
to protect the parameter data from insiders who have access authority, the threat risks from the
prevention are critical.
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7.2.3.4 Summary
Case study 1 explains how insiders can manipulate inspection results by compromising the
digital entity of the system. According to the IASAF analysis, this attack scenario poses less threat
risks from Actor and Implementation domains, but Preparation domain. This means that the attack
scenario highly depends on the insider's ability and authority to implement the attack successfully.
The LIAS, the system including the blockchain layer, can easily counter this attack. Even
though insiders have the access authority to the machine learning parameters, they only can access
and use it with the transaction hash through the service layer, which is protected by the blockchain
communication protocol. If the machine learning parameters are needed to be changed, the change
must be announced to the entire system components. Besides, the digital footprint will remain in
the blockchain layer, which is immutable and impossible to manipulate without any validation
process.
7.2.4

Case Study 2: Social Engineering Attack
Social engineering attack can be considered as involuntary insider attack because it makes

insiders reveal accessible routes into the system to outsiders without their intention. By accessing
malicious websites or spam mail, naïve insiders can accidentally install malware, which can
incapacitate network security mechanisms, such as a firewall, for outside attackers (Salahdine &
Kaabouch, 2019).
For Case study 2, it is assumed that one of the insiders' devices in LIAS is already
compromised due to the social engineering attack. Thus, outside attackers are able to conduct
Denial of Service (DOS) attacks on the system. DOS attack is the most common network attack
vector in the world (Zhang et al., 2016). DOS attack disturbs information exchanges by making
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network resources consume a sheer volume of invalid data. This case study shows how DOS attack
can disturb LIAS's inspection process. Also, the response time in retrieving the machine learning
parameter data is presented and explained to demonstrate the attack.
7.2.4.1 Attack Description

Figure 41 Denial of Service Attack
Denial of Service Attack (DOS) attack exploits a limitation in the capacity of processing
data for the target system. By creating and sending a large amount of invalid data, the target
system’s data processing can be interrupted. For this attack, the attacker must have the target's IP
address and need access to the target's LAN. However, since DOS attack does not require any premanipulation to launch the attack, social engineering attacks have been used to initiate the attacks.
If a naïve insider unintentionally installs malicious malware via clicking spam mail or uncertified
webpages, the route to the target system can be opened via the insider's machine that is used to
implement DOS attack.
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7.2.4.2 Attack Simulation
To simulate DOS attack on the LIAS, Kali Linux's hping3 tool was used. For the attack
parameters, five packets per second with one-hundred bytes invalid data, which is very light attack
intensity, was used to attack, because the tool was too strong enough to crush the program. For the
experiment purpose, LIAS continuously retrieves the trained weight and bias data with 100
iterations. The attack was inflicted on the LIAS after the 50th iteration to compare with the ideal
state. Finally, the response time of retrieving data from the local storage to LIAS was measured
for the experiment result. The result can be found in Figure 42.
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Figure 42 DOS Attack Result

Seen from above, the response time shows irregularities after the 50th iteration. A total 28
iterations out of 50 were affected by the simulated DOS attack. However, it is likely that the
communication will be totally halted if the real UDP DoS attack was implemented. From the
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empirical experiments, DOS attack with more than fifty packets per second was enough to crush
the communication.
7.2.4.3 IASAF Analysis
The IASAF analysis was conducted in the same way as case study 1, and the results are
presented in Table 18.
Table 18 IASAF Result for Case Study 2
Domain

Key Factor

Indicator Risk Degree

Motivations

A1

***

Numbers

A2

***

Access

P1

**

Targets

P2

*

Surreptitiousness

I1

*

Duration

I2

*

Damage Scope

C1

***

Detection Time

C2

*

Restoration

R1

**

Prevention

R2

***

Actor

Preparation

Implementation

Consequence

Recovery
Moderate (*), Significant (**), Critical (***)
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Figure 43 Radar Chart Analysis for Case Study 2
Since the attack for case study 2 is based on the social engineering attack, the motivation
from the insiders in the system is unpredictable and unknown. Furthermore, the attack could target
the uncertain number of the insiders, the treat risks from Actor domain is very critical. However,
since launching DOS attack requires many resources and power with multiple targets to disturb
the system operation, Preparation domain shows low threat risks. Also, DOS attack will remain a
myriad of digital footprints because it is based on the network activity. Besides, the attack could
take a long time period from gathering enough information about the attack target. Since DOS
attack is basically interrupting communications among devices, its damage scope would be
comparably enlarged. But the attack will be discovered shortly because the abnormal behavior of
the entities in the system can be observed immediately.
7.2.4.4 Summary
Case study 2 illustrates DOS attack scenario on the system when the insiders are under
social engineering attack and reveal the system vulnerabilities against outside attackers. Since an
uncertain number of insiders without specific motivations can be involved in this attack, Actor
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domain poses significant threat risks to the system. But the risks from Preparation and
Implementation domains are negligible because DOS attack created digital footprints from the
sheer volume of the network activity and takes a long time to actually launch the attack.
For the LIAS with the blockchain layer, the communication will not be disturbed at all
because the blockchain network is formed in a decentralized structure. Thus, to affect the
blockchain communication, all the nodes should be attacked at the same time, which is called
Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attack (Mahjabin et al., 2017). Since DDOS attack requires
tremendous volume of network resources from outside of the system, the attack could be fruitless
(Mirkin et al., 2020).

7.2.5

Case Study 3: Injecting Malicious Item
Additive Manufacturing (AM) fabricates three-dimensional objects by continuously

adding material layer by layer from a computer-aided design (CAD) model. In recent years, an
unprecedented level of autonomy in AM has been enabled by CPMS. AM's machines can have
constant interactions with each other through the internet or other computer networks.
However, insider threat risks in AM are growing due to the sheer volume and pervasiveness
of data and increased accessibility in the networks. Particularly, since the infill structure of the 3D
model is usually generated during the conversion process of a CAD file to G-code by the thirdparty program, the malicious item can be easily injected by insiders. Also, it is hard to detect the
attack on infill structure because interior defects can occur without affecting the exterior (Wu et
al., 2017).
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Case study 3 illustrates how insiders can inject malicious item, which can bypass or
incapacitate the existing security mechanism. The testbed based on SPLC was used for this case
study. The insider will manually change the G-code file, which has the lower infill density, but the
same exterior, to deceive the existing security mechanism of the testbed. The Minimum Mean
Absolute Percentage Error (MMAPE) was developed and used to simulate the existing security
mechanism. MMAPE will be utilized to demonstrate the attack. The attack scenario was analyzed
by using IASAF, and it is compared with the system with the blockchain layer to explain how
blockchain technology can prevent this attack from insiders.
7.2.5.1 Attack Description
This attack scenario includes specific motivation for the attack. A 3D printer worker for
the supplier wants to decrease manufacturing cost and 3D printing process time by decreasing the
infill density of the products. The percentage of infill density of the product decides the amount of
filament printed inside the products, which affects the strength and duration of the product. Thus,
it can yield serious quality issues if the infill density is lowered. However, infill defectives do not
affect the exterior of the product, so it is hard to be detected after printing. Thus, layer-by-layer
inspection is required to monitor the infill defectives.
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Figure 44 Physical Auditing
Currently, a physical auditing was adopted to the testbed. The physical auditing is
collecting physical data, which are obtained from the physical machine by using multiple sensors,
to verify machine operation. Seen from Figure 44, the physical auditing consists of three physical
data inspections: acceleration, acoustic, and image.
Accelerometer data, acoustic data, and image data can be collected for the physical auditing
by using the GY-521 sensor, MEMS microphone, and Logitech C525, respectively. To verify the
machine operation in a timely manner, the physical auditing system requires a simplistic
classification algorithm to avoid redundant delays. In this case, average pooling (AP) and mean
absolute percentage error (MAPE) can be used to reduce the data dimensions while the data
originality remains for the classification (Yu et al., 2017). However, this classification model is an
under-fitted model to validate the AIM, which yields subtle errors that might be ignored. Also,
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each collected data set likely starts at a different point (beginning of the machine operation) due
to the low-quality sensors. Thus, MMAPE classification was developed to increase the
classification sensitivity. MMAPE is provided in Figure 45.
Given:(𝑎1 , 𝑏1 ), … , (𝑎𝑚 , 𝑏𝑚 ) 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑎𝑚 , 𝑏𝑚 ∈ ℝ
Offset 𝑘:
𝑘 = {−𝑝 + 1, −𝑝 + 2, … , 𝑝 − 2, 𝑝 − 1}, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑝 = 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛

Average Pooling 𝐴𝑃(𝑥𝑙 , 𝑦𝑙 ):
𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝑙 =

𝑚
𝑝

𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖 = {1, 1 + 𝑝, 1 + 2𝑝, … , 1 + (𝑙 − 1)𝑝},

1

1

𝑖+𝑃−𝑘
𝑥𝑙 = 𝑃 ∑𝑖+𝑃−𝑘
𝑖=1−𝑘 𝑎𝑖 , 𝑦𝑙 = 𝑃 ∑𝑖=1−𝑘 𝑏𝑖 ,

Minimum Mean Absolute Percentage Error 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑝𝑒:
𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑝𝑒(𝑧𝑘 ) = 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 {

100%
𝑙

𝑥𝑗 −𝑦𝑗
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Prediction:
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = {

0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑝𝑒(𝑧𝑘 ) < 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑
1, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
Figure 45 MMAPE

Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE) is generally used for the prediction model,
comparing two data sets by calculating absolute distance values. However, due to the low-accurate
sensor, each collected data set likely starts at a different point. Thus, MAPE applies an offset value
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𝑘 to the Average Pooling 𝐴𝑃(𝑥𝑙 , 𝑦𝑙 ) to find the certain value that makes minimized mean absolute
percentage error. In this way, the asymmetry between the data points can be solved.
7.2.5.2 Attack Simulation
In this attack scenario, there are three groups of samples. The first group is "Original,"
which is the intended manufacturing production with the legitimate manufacturing specification.
The second group is "Defective." This group is well known defective type, and the physical
auditing system was designed to detect such defectives. Finally, the last group is Malicious Item
by Insider (MII). This group is fabricated by insiders, who want to decrease manufacturing cost
and 3D printing process time for their own benefit.
To design the samples of three groups, a 3D model of 1.5 × 1.5 × 1.5 inches cube was
generated as a G-code file. For the defective group, a cylinder shape defective (0.5 inches
diameters with 1.5 inches height) was injected. In the case of MII group, the original group's design
was used, but the infill density was modified by the 3D printer software (CURA 4.2.1). A total of
108 layers were generated from each design, and some images of the 54th layer for each group are
shown below.

Figure 46 Experiment Designs
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The amount of filament is reduced by the percentage of the infill density. According to the
CURA, 13% infill density requires 6.77m of filament while 6.44m of filament for 12% infill
density. The printing time is also reduced from 59 minutes to 41 minutes. GY-521, MEMS
microphone, and Logitech C521 were attached to the Monoprice MP Select Mini 3D printer V1 to
collect the data. The classification result is prepared in Table 19.
Table 19 Classification Result
Physical Data

Sample

Average of 𝒎𝒂𝒑𝒆 Prediction

Original

0.1085

True

Accelerometer
(Threshold: 0.30) Defective
MII

0.3665

False

0.2243

True

Original

0.2571

True

0.4879

False

0.3861

True

0

True

0.0386

False

0.0167

True

Acoustic
(Threshold: 0.40) Defective
MII
Original
Image
(Threshold: 0.02) Defective
MII

Seen from above, the MII was able to bypass the physical auditing system. The important
difference from image manipulation is that insiders do not have to modify the digital assets, but
the physical assets need to compromise the manufacturing process without being discovered.
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7.2.5.3 IASAF Analysis
Table 20 IASAF Result for Case Study 3
Domain

Key Factor

Indicator Risk Degree

Motivations

A1

**

Numbers

A2

**

Access

P1

***

Targets

P2

***

Surreptitiousness

I1

***

Duration

I2

***

Damage Scope

C1

*

Detection Time

C2

***

Restoration

R1

*

Prevention

R2

***

Actor

Preparation

Implementation

Consequence

Recovery
Moderate (*), Significant (**), Critical (***)

Actor
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Recovery

Preparation

2
1
0

Consequence

Implementation

Figure 47 Radar Chart Analysis for Case Study 3
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In accordance with case study 1, it is assumed that the insider can legitimately access the
specific digital entity, in this case, a G-code file. For the same reason, potential insiders for this
attack are limited due to the access authority. Therefore, the posed threat risks from the Actor
domain are low. However, Preparation and Implementation domain shows the high degree of the
posed threat risks. The insider already has the security clearance to the necessary entities, and there
is only a single target for the attack: the infill density. Moreover, since injecting malicious items
can be seen as a legitimate activity for the insider, it is difficult to detect the attack. Also, the attack
damage occurs immediately after injecting the item.
7.2.5.4 Summary
Case study 3 illustrates how insiders can inject malicious items, which can bypass the
physical auditing process of the system. Due to the requirements and nature of the attack scenario,
there are critical threat risks posed from Preparation and Implementation domains.
The SPLC with the blockchain layer can be an effective countermeasure against attacks.
The G-code file can be uploaded on the blockchain layer by the manager, and insiders can only
access the G-code file via the service layer. Also, the 3D printing machine can only be operated
by inputting the transaction hash of the G-code file. In this way, the G-code file can be free from
malicious manipulation, and the malicious item injection also can be prevented.
7.2.6

Case Study 4: Sniffing and Spoofing
Insiders who are knowledgeable of the IT network structure of the system can use sniffing

and spoofing codes to breach or manipulate manufacturing information. Since insiders are in the
same network environment, it is easy to use the internet network vulnerabilities to succeed in the
attack such as Domain Name System (DNS) server attacks.
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Case study 4 demonstrates how insiders can manipulate the communications among
manufacturing entities by exploiting Man in the Middle (MITM) attack. MITM attack exploits
the victim's communication channel. By redirecting data flow to the attacker, it can be easily
manipulated and sent to the victim. Usually, a redirecting step requires sensitive information such
as a main server's IP address as well as physical access to connect to the target's Local Area
Network (LAN). For these reasons, insiders can play an important role to successfully implement
MITM attack because they have legitimate access authentications for these. Thus, they can simply
compromise DNS server, which will redirect the communication channel.

7.2.6.1 Attack Description

Figure 48 Man In the Middle Attack
The main idea of MITM attack is redirecting the victim's communication channel to
attackers and manipulating or injecting malicious communication. Generally, a redirecting step
needs a lot of efforts and conditions. For example, the Kaminsky Attack, which is one of the remote
DNS cache poisoning attacks, is required to guess 16-bit transaction number to succeed in the
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attack (Hmood et al., 2015). The chance is one out of 232. However, in regard to insiders, a simple
modification of DNS server with their access authentication enables to redirect the communication
channel. Furthermore, this attack can be a stealthy and critical attack method because insiders can
control the frequency of malicious output results.

7.2.6.2 Attack Simulation
To simulate the attack to the testbed, one virtual machine (attacker) in the same LAN was
used to run MITM algorithm using SCAPY package of Python. By using SCAPY function send()
and sniff(), the communication between PLC device and the service application can be easily
altered. For example, an insider operates the machine with input value 0, but it is changed to 1
before it arrives at the service application. Therefore, eventually, the machine will be operated
with the input value 1, which is the compromised value by MITM attack.
For the test, the main control server sent out input data with Input value 0, which is
expected to activate the output value 0. Meanwhile, the attacker's virtual machine will send out
input value 1 to the PLC device whenever it detects a legitimate packet from the main control
server. The test was conducted for 100 seconds, which represents 100 iterations, and the attack
was implemented after the 50th iteration. The result is in below.
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Figure 49 MITM Attack Result
In the testbed, the attack won the race condition at a rate of 50%, which can easily be
modified by changing the number of sending input data.

149

7.2.6.3 IASAF Analysis
Table 21 IASAF Result for Case Study 4
Domain

Key Factor

Indicator Risk Degree

Motivations

A1

*

Numbers

A2

**

Access

P1

***

Targets

P2

**

Surreptitiousness

I1

**

Duration

I2

***

Damage Scope

C1

*

Detection Time

C2

***

Restoration

R1

**

Prevention

R2

**

Actor

Preparation

Implementation

Consequence

Recovery
Moderate (*), Significant (**), Critical (***)

Actor
5
4
3

Recovery

2

Preparation

1
0

Consequence

Implementation

Figure 50 Radar Chart Analysis for Case Study 4
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MITM attack necessitates IT knowledge and skills and physical access to the local LAN.
Therefore, only a small group of insiders could be an actor for this attack scenario. This is the
reason why Actor domain poses low threat risks. However, for the same reason of case study 3,
Preparation and Implementation domains pose high threat risks. Since the main objectives of
MITM attack are to breach the manufacturing information and to manipulate manufacturing
operation, it does not directly harm the physical entities. But the attack detection timeline is
unpredictable, the detection time from Consequence domain poses high threat risks.

7.2.6.4 Summary
Case study 4 demonstrates how insiders can launch MITM attack on the PLC network
environments. Due to the difficulty of the attack, the posed threat risks from Actor domain are low,
but Preparation and Implementation domains show high threat risks.
In the case of the SPLC with the blockchain layer, MITM attack would not work because
it uses a different network communication protocol. Since the blockchain delivers the transaction
data through a peer-to-peer network, it is arduous to sneak into the network. Therefore, blockchain
technology provides an effective security enhancement against MITM attack. Although the
transaction hash itself can be exploited to launch the attack, such as Replay Attack, the data in the
transaction cannot be modified due to its decentralized data management system. Moreover, the
private blockchain system can limit and manage the network nodes, so it can help to trace and
identify insiders effectively.
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Chapter 8. Conclusion and Future works

This dissertation proposes an insider threat tolerant Cyber-Physical Manufacturing System,
and it is validated by a four-step process: Establish, Build, Identify, and Simulation (EBIS). In this
chapter, the summary and conclusion of the dissertation are presented, and its contributions and
impact on the field are described. Finally, the limitation of this research and future works are
presented.
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8.1

Summary
This dissertation seeks to address insider threat issues in manufacturing systems by

developing an insider threat tolerant Cyber-Physical Manufacturing System enhanced by a
Service-Oriented Blockchain (SOB) augmentation. Insiders are anyone who has been or is being
affiliated with a system. Since insiders have knowledge and access authentications of the system's
properties, they can perform more serious attacks than outsiders. To reduce threat risks from
insiders, SOB makes physical and digital entities reusable and interoperable via a service
application, which enables the blockchain communication protocol over the entities. In this way,
services for the manufacturing process can be available with less arbitrary delays while remaining
its strong security from the blockchain.

Figure 51 EBIS Validation Process
To validate the insider threat tolerant Cyber-Physical Manufacturing System with SOB
augmentation, EBIS validation process was employed to strike a balance between well-principled
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formal security guarantees and empirical security enhancement from practical approaches. The
EBIS validation process consists of a series of steps in developing and performing security analysis
processes to improve and validate the system’s security. The four steps of the EBIS are as follows:
Establish system architecture, Build a physical testbed, Identify attack scenarios, and Simulate
attacks and defense.
To establish system architecture, first, a survey was conducted on blockchain applications
in manufacturing systems. Various approaches using blockchain technology were investigated to
identify technical challenges in blockchain implementation into the manufacturing systems.
Accordingly, differences between the centralized system structure and decentralized system
structure are discussed as well as the differences between the decentralized system architecture
and distributed system architecture. Finally, an insider threat tolerant Cyber-Physical
Manufacturing System augmented by a service-oriented blockchain was proposed to overcome
security vulnerabilities against insiders and technical limitations of blockchain technology. The
system consists of four layers: user layer, entity layer, service layer, and blockchain layer, and
each layer's details were explained with the example.
To build the physical testbed, two simulation models were designed and developed from
the established system architecture: Layer Image Auditing System (LIAS) and Secure
Programmable Logic Controller (SPLC). The testbeds for each model were built and validated
with the experiments with the physical data. These models are explained in detail, and the
discussion for each model is provided to describe how the blockchain can help to mitigate insider
threat risks in the system.
To identify insider attack scenarios, insider threats in CPMS are examined in depth. In
order to better understand different ways in which a system can be attacked by insiders, Insider
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Attack Tree (IAT) was developed and presented. The IAT consists of four parts: Root, Branch,
Sub-Branch, and Leaf. The Root is the eventual attack target for insiders, and the Branches
represent three different assets in CPMS. Sub-branches indicate the attack targets of assets while
the Leaf represents attack vectors.
To simulate attacks and defenses, four attack scenarios were chosen from the Insider Attack
Tree: Manipulating Inspection Process, Sniffing and Spoofing, Injecting Malicious Item, and
Social Engineering. Each attack scenario is explained and developed as a case study. Therefore, a
total of four case studies were presented. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the blockchain, two
simulation models (LIAS and SPLC) without the blockchain layer were built and used for the case
studies. Furthermore, each case study was analyzed by using an Insider Attack Scenario
Assessment Framework (IASAF), which is proposed to evaluate the attack scenarios within five
domains: Actor, Preparation, Implementation, Consequence, and Recovery. The proposed
framework was used to evaluate four attack scenarios.
In conclusion, insiders can pose critical threats to CPMS due to their trusted access
authentication and knowledge of the systems. According to the case studies and analysis from
IASAF, blockchain technology provides a security enhancement against insiders. Also, SOB
augmentation to the system reduces redundant and arbitrary delays in the system's communications
while maintaining the flexibility and connectivity among digital and physical entities of the system.
By storing data in a decentralized way with the validation process, the blockchain can provide
decision-makers with higher trust in their manufacturing processes. It also enables the vision of
CPMS without entirely modernizing legacy systems.
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8.2

Contribution
This dissertation advances the understanding of insider threats and blockchain

implementations in CPMS by presenting key issues remaining in the literature. In support of this
statement, this dissertation describes the following contributions:
Insider threats in the manufacturing industry have been identified and analyzed. To
disclose insider threat risks in manufacturing systems, the dissertation investigated the influence
of insiders, their potential threats, and vulnerabilities in CPMS. As a result, Insider Attack Tree
(IAT) was designed and utilized to identify potential insider threat scenarios in the proposed
system. IAT can be widely used to identify attack scenarios in an intuitive manner, appropriately
conveying security information to even layperson (Song & Moon, 2020a).
Blockchain applications for manufacturing systems in the literature have been
investigated and analyzed. To discuss how manufacturing systems can effectively adopt
blockchain technology, a survey was conducted. To investigate a recent and relevant analysis of
the research trend, this survey consists of 148 articles of major relevance were selected from 380
publications, presented between 2018 and 2021. Also, to help to understand the trend history of
research for blockchain technology in manufacturing systems, the dissertation presents a
Technology Roadmap, which is visualized the chronological history of the technology to support
a flexible and long-range plan.
Technical challenges in the blockchain implementation have been resolved by
developing the Service-Oriented Blockchain (SOB). To solve the technical challenges identified
from the survey, this dissertation introduced a Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA), which could
be a potential solution for the challenges. SOA can recomposite and reconstruct discrete
components of a system to reuse them for other services. SOB was inspired by these ideas and
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concepts. SOB enables smart and collaborative services with less arbitrary delays while remaining
its strong security from the blockchain. By retaining manufacturing data in the blockchain and
continuously validating the digital entities with the blockchain communication protocol, the data
integrity of digital entities will be assured.
An assessment framework from the viewpoint of the insider attack scenario has been
developed and presented. To investigate the system's security vulnerabilities and evaluate the
insider attack scenarios in a practical manner, this dissertation proposed Insider Attack Scenario
Assessment Framework (IASAF). Details of IASAF were explained, and it is demonstrated via
four case studies analysis. The example of questionnaires was also presented.
8.3

Limitation and Future works
In spite of the promising security improvement provided, there are still unaddressed

limitations and further possible improvements for future work.
The disadvantages of employing the blockchain should be thoroughly examined before it
can be fully utilized. It is essential to overcome the lack of privacy, standardization, scalability,
and inefficiency to integrate existing security architectures with blockchain's security mechanisms.
So far, many blockchain platforms have been developed and proposed with various consensus
algorithms and programming languages to resolve such issues, but their potentials as
manufacturing infrastructures have not been properly reviewed. Thus, it is necessary to develop
the evaluation methodology to understand the effectiveness of the blockchain on reliability and
performance in manufacturing systems. This work can contribute to identifying possible solutions
for challenges in employing blockchain technology and understanding the impact of various
consensus algorithms and programming languages on the blockchain's performance.
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As the manufacturing industry is moving toward CPMS, many manufacturing systems
have adopted new technology from computer systems and internet networks to improve and
optimize their manufacturing logistics. Despite the vital advantages of these adoptions, it is not
ideal to fully incorporate the new technology due to the attack risk from many cyber-attacks that
have been developed for decades. The majority of the cyber-attacks were already analyzed and
prevented by developing countermeasures, but these attacks could be serious threats to a
manufacturing system that includes a physical domain. Thus, it is important to understand existing
cyber-attacks and their countermeasures to investigate whether these attacks can be exploited and
damage the physical domain in manufacturing systems. SEED Labs is a NSF-funded project,
which provides over 30 labs that cover a wide range of topics in computer and information security,
including: software security, network security, web security, operating system security, and mobile
app security (Du, 2019). Further attack scenarios—which are motivated by SEED Labs—specified
in manufacturing systems can be developed for future works. The new attack scenarios can explain
how cybersecurity can be extended to manufacturing system security, and this will allow engineers
to soundly examine cross-domain system behavior.
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